COMPOSING AGENCY: USING INQUIRY TO PROMOTE SOCIAL ACTION by Gurley, Leanna




















SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
 














LEANNA LYNN GURLEY 











A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE 













    ______________________________ 





























































© Copyright by LEANNA LYNN GURLEY 2017 





I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my family.  First, I thank 
my husband Matt, who supported me through all the challenges this project 
posed over the years.  He believed in me and encouraged me to not give 
up during the many times when I was almost certain I could go no further. I 
also thank my children Isobel and Dorian.  They posted notes of 
encouragement throughout our home and helped me to believe in my 
ability to meet this challenge.  Finally, I thank my mom and dad.  They may 
not have understood the challenges I have faced in higher education, but 
they still encouraged me to follow my dreams and complete this degree. 
I want to acknowledge and thank my dissertation co-chair: Dr. Chris 
Carter.  He stayed on my committee long after leaving the University, 
continuing to communicate with me via Facetime and phone calls.  His 
questions, comments, and advice pushed me to be a better writer.  I also 
want to thank the other members of my dissertation committee, Dr. Susan 
Kates, Dr. Sandra Tarabochia, Dr. Vincent Leitch, and Dr. Justin Reedy for 
their continued support. 
Finally, I want to thank all the other friends and colleagues who 
have contributed in less direct, but significant ways, encouraging me to 




Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements iv 
Table of Contents v 
List of Figures vii 
Abstract viii 
Chapter One 1 
Introduction 1 
A Social Problem: Individualism and Democracy 17 
Agency as Rhetorical Invention: Activist Inquiry 24 
Research Questions 28 
Overview of Chapters 29 
Chapter Two 33 
Challenging Recognitions 33 
What is Recognition?: Acknowledgment 37 
Audience Addressed: Inquiring about the Reader 38 
Audience Invoked: Composing the Reader 55 
Social Responsibility and the Need for Engaged Experience 61 
Conclusion 66 
Chapter Three 70 
vi 
 
Challenging Motivations 70 
Motivation Work 73 
Engaged Experience: The Right Rhetorical Stance for Motivation 
Work 75 
Motivation: Engaged Experience and Disruption 91 
Conclusion 101 
Chapter Four 104 
Challenging (A)venues 104 
Why (A)venues? 109 
(A)venues for Social Action 122 
Conclusion 133 
Chapter 5 135 
Conclusion: Taking Activist Inquiry on the Road 135 
Activist Inquiry in a Nutshell 138 
The Limitations of a Top-Down Model for Social Action 145 
Activist Inquiry in the 21st Century 148 
References 153 





List of Figures 
Figure 2.1 Homeless Youth Advocacy poster 52 
Figure 3.1 Caucasian Jesus (left); Black Jesus (right) 93 
Figure 4.1 Visual representation of praxis 108 
Figure 4.2 Homeless youth advocacy poster 119 
Figure 4.3 Halsted Street circa 1900 124 







In Rhetoric/Composition studies, agency has been a highly 
contested concept, straightaway invoking the tension between two 
dominant perspectives.  Agency is viewed as either an internal quality 
possessed by an individual or a construction of external discourses.  While 
such discussions seeking to define agency are important, they tend to 
focus on interpretation and analysis over the production of agency, which 
is a key component of social action.  People must believe their deliberate 
actions can cause positive socio-political change.  With this dissertation, I 
propose that thinking of agency as a form of rhetorical invention puts the 
focus on the production of agency for effective social action.  In working 
towards this goal, I develop the notion of activist inquiry: a non-
prescriptive, inquiry-oriented approach to inventing agency for social 







Agency, n. II. Action, capacity to act; 5. (a) action or intervention 
producing a particular effect; means, instrumentality, mediation; (b) Such 
action embodied or personified; a being or thing that acts to produce a 
particular effect or result. 
 
Inquiry, n. 1. (a) The action of seeking, esp. (now always) for truth, 
knowledge, or information concerning something; search, research, 
investigation, examination; (b) A coursse of inquiry, an investigation. 
 
Social action  n.  (a) deliberate action that results or is intended to result 
in a change in the institutions or conditions of social life; an instance of 
this;  (b) (Sociol.) action that takes place in a social context; action 
involving or oriented towards one or more other individuals; an instance of 
this. 
— Oxford English Dictionary 
 
Agency and social action are intimately connected.  People must 
have some sense that their actions do in fact have the ability to change 
the conditions of social life ever closer to a more equitable and just world.  
As Kristie Fleckenstein says, “[Agency is] crucial to social action because 
without both the belief in one’s ability to act in the world and the ability to 
act, no social action is possible” (2010 p. 42).  Social action asks 
individuals, alone or in conjunction with others, to believe in their ability to 
act in and upon the world for change — to believe in agency and to be 
activists, those people whose intentions are to assuage social injustice.  
However, agency can be a dubious term because a cloud of uncertainty 
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surrounds the capacity of human beings to make (semi)autonomous 
choices, act upon them, and achieve a particular end.  From a 
posthumanist view, agency can even be attributed to technologies, such 
as the algorithms that automatically function to present Facebook users 
with product advertisements that appeal to their individual interests.  In 
Rhetoric and Composition studies, as in many other fields, the definition of 
agency is continuously being renegotiated in large part because of the 
tension between humanist, postmodernist, and more recently 
posthumanist philosophical perspectives (Accardi, 2015 pp.1-5).  The 
humanist perspective holds that individuals have agency.  In other words, 
they have the ability, power, and authority to act as people say, “of their 
own free will.”  Although most rhetoric scholars reject this, what Lundberg 
and Gunn call the “possession metaphor,” a significant portion of the 
literature on agency still implies “a rational individual capable of inventing 
ideas autonomously and pursuing an intention to engage or provoke an 
audience” (Accardi, 2015 p.2).  The humanist view contradicts 
postmodernist theories, which refute it on the grounds that power, 
authority, and other socio-cultural factors such as race and gender for 
example constrain people’s agency.  As Herndl and Licona argue, agency 
cannot be located in the subject (2007 p.141).  It quickly becomes 
uncertain to what extent or degree a person's actions are encouraged or 
limited by these factors and where agency, for lack of a better word, 
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“resides.”  A posthumanist orientation, according to Herndl and Licona’s 
conception of it, posits that agency possesses the subject, which: 
Refocuses our attention on the ways that the subject is an effect of 
structures, forces, and modes of enjoyment that might precede or 
produce it.  This reversal of agent’s relation to agency directs 
attention to quintessentially rhetorical concerns: to the constitutive 
function of trope, to modes of address, to the dialectics of 
identification and difference, and even to the power of concealing 
exercise of techne under the veil of natural. (2005 p.97) 
While an individual may either claim agency or others claim it for them, 
posthumanism can help rhetoric scholars examine what brought a desired 
effect to fruition.  However, for all these humanist, postmodernist, and 
posthumanist perspectives, a big question remains: How can someone, 
anyone, help another person or people to believe they have the ability to 
alter an unjust situation and then act upon that belief? 
This dissertation explores a method of inquiry that aims to direct 
attention away from the immediate invocation of the predominate 
dichotomy - humanist versus postmodernist - and focus on the production 
of agency for social action.  In this context, social action refers to any 
deliberate action that has the goal of effecting positive social and political 
change.  I argue that agency is a form of rhetorical invention that I call 
activist inquiry.  One of the underlying features of activist inquiry is that it 
approaches the task of generating social action in a non-prescriptive way 
and to help describe this I use Jane Addams’s Democracy and Social 
Ethics(1902).1  It is ideal for explicating agency as a form of rhetorical 
invention because Addams approached her own rhetorical task non-
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prescriptively, believing that people will only be motivated to assuage 
social problems if they come to recognize and understand injustices from 
a personal point of view.  “She never said specifically what people should 
do,” biographer Louise Knight says.  Addams “want[ed] readers to make 
their own discoveries” (2010 p.107).  Being non-prescriptive in this context 
means facilitating, leading, and encouraging instead of telling someone 
exactly what they should or must do, think, or believe.  Attempting to 
impose ideas, beliefs, and values on others is generally met with 
resistance and interpreted as agonistic, which can hinder people with 
different socio-political and cultural views from being open to engaging 
with each other, having experiences with them, and reflecting and learning 
from those interactions.  Experience, in the context of Addams’ work and 
activist inquiry, calls for practical interactions, contact, association, and 
cooperation across difference.  It asks people to engage with the 
unfamiliar daily, lived realities and understandings of the marginalized and 
oppressed, who are typically living in poverty.  Reflecting upon such 
experiences can prompt knowledge-building and through the intersections 
of these – experience, reflection, and learning – possibilities for right social 
action and agency can be imagined, put into practice, and evaluated for 
their efficacy.  Activist inquiry emphasizes this process of experiential 
knowledge-building in an attempt to move past the reluctance and 




At its core, activist inquiry is both motivated by and nurtures a 
social, democratic ethic such as that forwarded by Addams. This ethic 
values equality, diversity, tolerance, justice, the common good, and an 
openness to difference and change.  Practicing this ethic, from Addams 
perspective, entails being socially responsible by engaging with different 
others and taking action to assuage injustice.  Naturally, there are 
obstacles to practicing such a social ethic and activist inquiry attempts to 
overcome some of them.  In Vision, Rhetoric and Social Action in the 
Composition Classroom, Kristie Fleckenstein shares similar concerns 
about the challenges to social action.  She identifies “Three central 
challenges [that] confound social action. First, how does an individual (or a 
group) perceive the need for change?”; second, “do outlets or means for 
enacting agency exist?”; and third, “…if agency is possible, are venues 
available within which to alter rather than reinforce the unjust situation?” 
(2010 p.17).  I complicate Fleckenstein’s challenges first by exploring 
more closely how a rhetor may encourage others to perceive, or put 
another way, acknowledge their social responsibility.  Second, I examine 
the challenge of motivating others to social action.  Recognizing one’s 
duty to help others in need does not guarantee someone will be motivated 
to take social action. Finally, I consider how insights from these 
experiences can help activists imagine new avenues for effective, ethical 
social change: to develop a theory to approach a problem, act upon it, and 
reflect upon its efficacy.  For brevity, I abridge these challenges to 
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recognition, motivation, and avenues.  In summation, the underlying goal 
of activist inquiry is to encourage people to recognize their social 
responsibility (perception and motivation), better understand the reality of 
an unjust situation (motivation and avenues), and accept their agentive 
role in making decisions that push for a more just society (avenues and 
motivation).  
 
Agency: Possession, Resource, Activity 
The humanist possession metaphor attached to agency persists in 
much of Rhetoric and Composition studies.  To be clear, agency as a term 
evokes its dictionary definitions, but agency as a metaphor is housed 
within attempts to explicate what its denotation implies.  Agency as 
autonomous, individual possession remains the central metaphor, even as 
the scholarship below shows rhetoricians’ attempts to steer the discussion 
towards more materially, environmentally, culturally, and socially inclusive 
conceptualizations of agency.  This dissertation makes no claim to dismiss 
the possession metaphor or present a definitive way to steer clear of it, 
only to offer an inquiry-based method that emphasizes the production or 
generation of agency over humanist and postmodernist arguments 
surrounding its meaning.  Nonetheless, those arguments are still important 
because they strive to consider the plethora of factors that contribute to 
agency, something activist inquiry also considers.  In 2004, the Alliance of 
Rhetoric Societies’ (ARS) conference focused on agency, and subsequent 
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publications remain a touch point for discussing the term and its metaphor.  
In Cheryl Geisler’s report on the meeting, she defines rhetoric as an 
interpretive theory that “describes a variety of rhetorical positions, some 
with more and some with less rhetorical agency” (2004 p.16).  Here, “with” 
stands in for “have” and assumes a person “has” or “owns” agency.  
People exercise their agency as if it were an innate possession or an 
attribute of themselves that can be used whenever they feel like calling 
upon it – an essentialist claim wherein a person more or less has within 
them the potential for agency at all times.  This calls attention to the 
difficulty of separating the term from the metaphor.  Although she was 
attempting to define rhetoric in such a way that would not invoke the 
possession metaphor for agency, it was still implied. 
To emphasize the pervasiveness of the metaphor, another example 
from the ARS meeting arose when participants discussed the conditions of 
agency: the descriptions of the circumstances under which rhetors are 
able to act.   Specifically, they looked at agency in terms of its often taken-
for-granted status among hegemonically dominant groups, such as “white 
male,” and discussed whether marginalized or subaltern groups can make 
a pre-determined socio-political impact given limited access to that 
discourse.  Close examinations of the conditions under which 
marginalized groups manage to speak and affect change, they claimed, 
“recovers” agency for minority populations (Geisler, 2004 p.10-11).  This 
also implies a humanist leaning.  Groups of people wrest agency from the 
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dominant discourse, possess it, and affect change.  Agency in the 
Margins: Stories of Outsider Rhetoric represents a similar example of 
collective agency as possession.   Editor Anne Meade Stockdell-Giesler, 
describes the compilation of articles as attempts to answer the question, 
“How do people who are defined as outsiders create agency – how do 
they become agents of change…?” (2010 p.9).  The dominant group “has” 
agency and the marginalized group wants to have it and to affect change 
because of having it.  In “Working Boundaries: From Student Resistance 
to Student Agency,” Gwen Gorzelsky reiterates the possession metaphor, 
defining student agency as “the ownership of their developing ideas and 
texts” (2009 p.64) and the need to value “students’ agency as interpreters 
of texts and ideas” (2009 p.65).   Here, students’ agency is blatantly tied to 
“ownership.”  In Community Literacy and the Rhetoric of Pubic 
Engagement, Linda Flower acknowledges “the grand narrative of 
American individualism, [where] agency belongs to the actor, the hero, or 
the heroine” (2008 p.193) and that in everyday use agency “depends on 
one’s power to control or at least influence external realities” (2008 p.55).  
Flower reveals a humanist position by describing agency as exercising 
one’s willed choice, taking agency, acting to dominate, and controlling or 
altering a situation.  Quite obviously, it is difficult not to invoke the 
possession metaphor and consider the postmodernist perspective on how 
agency can be the product of discourses and power relations. 
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The postmodern view defines agency in response to the death of 
the autonomous subject - interpellated, fragmented, constructed 
individuals whose actions cannot necessarily be attributed to them alone. 
Many factors limit the idea that a subject possesses agency.   Overlapping 
and competing discourses, of which they cannot be entirely conscious, 
fragment a cohesive sense of self.  In his book Fragments of Rationality: 
Postmodernity and the Subject of Composition, Faigley describes this 
fragmentation: 
What a person does, thinks, says, and writes cannot be interpreted 
unambiguously because any human action does not rise out of a 
unified consciousness but rather from a momentary identity that is 
always multiple and in some respects incoherent.  If consciousness 
is not fully present to one’s own self, then it cannot be made 
transparent to another. (1992 p.9) 
Constrained by both external and internal conditions of which he cannot 
be fully aware or entirely able to manipulate, individuals (and groups) 
cannot act with full intentionality to achieve a specific, desired effect.  
Therefore, they cannot “have” agency.  “This critique of agency,” Susan 
Wells observes, “has become so potent that it has left very little of the 
concept in tact” (Leff and Lunsford, 2004 p.62).   So while the humanist 
possession metaphor may be ubiquitous, the postmodern critique of 
agency, if taken too far, can render it useless.  If Addams and her readers 
cannot act to achieve a goal because social, economic, and political 
influences constrain them in ways they are not aware of, then there is little 
need to try to convince them to take social action.  The outcome would just 
be too unpredictable. 
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Some postmodern scholars try to rescue the term from the 
postmodern critique by reversing the possession metaphor – agency 
possesses the subject instead of the subject possessing agency.  In 
“Shifting Agency: Agency, Kairos, and the Possibilities of Social Action,” 
Herndl and Licona confront this issue by theorizing agency as “the 
conjunction of a set of social and subjective relations that constitute the 
possibility of action” (2007 p.135).   Herndl and Licona use agency to 
explore issues of power and authority and also criticize the idea that 
agency can be had or attributed to someone.  Through a close 
examination of how agency and authority interact, they argue that, 
“Agency is a social/semiotic intersection that offers only a potential for 
action, an opportunity” (Herndl and Licona, 2007 p.141).  Authority acts as 
a constraint and a potential resource to agency (Herndl and Licona 2007, 
p.135).  They forward the notion of “the agent function”: “the conjunction of 
the subject’s dispositions and the temporary and contingent conditions of 
possibility for rhetorical action” (Herndl and Licona, 2007 p.138).  Agency 
works in a particular way that depends on the ambiguous interplay 
between subjects and spaces where power and authority affects social 
action.  The example Herndl and Licona use is the introduction of womens’ 
studies programs in the university.  The initial backlash to these programs 
signifies an agentive intervention, they argue, but an agency constrained 
by a necessity to conform to academic expectations and institutional 
authority in order to “consolidate their symbolic capital” (Herndl and 
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Licona, 2007, p.145).  This example demonstrates a postmodern 
perspective and shows how the relationship between agency and authority 
does not necessarily prohibit agency but neither does it grant subjects free 
access to it.  Agency exists, but it is inhibited; here, by power and 
authority, which are unarguably factors that must be considered for activist 
inquiry. 
The tension between humanist and postmodernist orientations on 
agency form a seemingly intractable dichotomy.  A major theme at the 
ARS convention, as Geisler summarizes it, was critiquing this tension on 
the grounds that what they called “the ideology of agency” is one reason it 
persists.  The ideology of agency “concerns the link between rhetorical 
action and social change – in what sense can the actions of a rhetor be 
linked to consequences in the world” (Geisler, 2004 p.12).  Citing Dilip 
Gaonkar’s, rhetoric’s preoccupation with the postmodern critique of 
agency has resulted in an unnecessary and problematic ideology of 
agency.  Rhetoricians who hold this ideology insist on defining agency as 
the activity of a subject pursuing an intention: “the speaker as origin rather 
than articulation, strategy as intentional, discourse as constitutive of 
character and community, [and] ends that bind in common purpose” 
(Geisler, 2004 p.263).  These rhetoricians are aware of the problems with 
this view, but insist upon because, as Gaonkar claims, it has become a 
necessary illusion for linking rhetorical action and social change to causal 
agents.  The illusion rests in the rhetorician’s need to believe that an 
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agent’s intentional actions can be causally linked to effects.  Gunn 
suggests that debates constrained by the postmodern critique of agency 
are a fantasy that “both frames our exercise of agency and protects us 
from the ‘abject horror of contingency’” (qtd. in Geisler p.12).  Condit also 
calls it a necessary illusion central to rhetorician’s sense of purpose: 
“Without the concept of agency, [Condit] suggests, we do not have the 
necessary rationale for our efforts with our students and readers” (Geisler, 
2004 p.12).   We would rather believe that our actions have specific, 
intended effects than face the possibility that we cannot with any degree of 
certainty know what effects our actions will have in and on the world. 
In response to this, other rhetoricians have noted a similar issue 
that unnecessarily maintains the humanist versus postmodernist tension 
at the forefront of discussions surrounding agency.  Lundberg and Gunn 
argue that often rhetoricians misrepresent postmodernism in making their 
arguments against the autonomous individual of humanist thought.   They 
agree that agency is a social construction; however, in their article “ ‘Ouija 
Board, Are There Any Communications?’ Agency, Ontotheology, and the 
Death of the Humanist Subject, or, Continuing the ARS Conversation” they 
criticize Geisler for framing most of the participants’ positions on agency 
as responses to the post-modern critique of the autonomous agent and for 
advancing “a strawperson argument about ‘postmodernism’” (2005 p.83).  
Lundberg and Gunn note that key postmodernist thinkers’ such as Derrida, 
Lacan, and Foucault, “produced accounts of the human subject that 
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specify its radical contingency, its fragmentary qualities, and/or its 
dependence on generative systems beyond the seat of an insular 
individual consciousness” (2005 p.86).  However, they also point out that 
none of them “deny that the subject or representations of the subject exert 
significant effects, nor do they deny the subject a kind of social effectivity 
or agency” (2005 p.87).  In other words, Lunderberg and Gunn argue that 
Geisler (and others), oversimplify the postmodern critique and essentially 
make a straw man argument by characterizing it as the utter inability of an 
individual to prompt socio-political change and then attack this position. 
Lundberg and Gunn compare agency to playing the game Ouija.  The 
planchette moves around the Ouija board seemingly of its own accord and 
no one can determine who moved it.  According to Lundberg and Gunn, 
those who oversimplify postmodernism as Giesler and others do adopt an 
attitude of being  “mindlessly moved around by the agency of the 
planchette (the Symbolic, ideology, discourse, History, and so on)…” 
(2005 p.92).  Instead, Lundberg and Gunn propose an “agnostic 
disposition” towards agency, meaning that “players [of the Ouija game] 
should pay attention to the movements of the game without prefiguring the 
meaning of the movements, reducing them to an absolutist causal 
account” (2005 p. 85).  Paying attention to the movements of the game 
emphasizes how agency functions because this paying attention does not 
seek to definitively locate who or what is doing the moving, opening us up 
to the unconditional “what if.”  This, they argue, describes the postmodern 
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take on agency that presumes agency possesses the subject instead of 
the subject possessing agency.  In terms of inquiry, “what if” maintains an 
attitude of willingness to discover that Addams would have appreciated, 
given her emphasis on being open to new and varied experiences.  
However, even with the Ouija board situation, people, not rhetoricians, 
generally persist in trying to definitively locate the source of the action, 
compelled to know the cause. 
Other ways of thinking about agency were posited at the ARS 
convention.  One was that perhaps agency, “can be understood as a 
resource constructed in particular contexts and in particular ways” 
(Geisler, 2004 p. 2).  Thinking of agency as a constructed resource is 
more compatible with agency as a form of rhetorical invention – with 
activist inquiry.  Activist inquiry implies that agency can be generated 
through an inventional approach.  A resource denotes a supply of agency 
from which someone can draw.  Presumably, once it has been 
constructed, it is then available to people.  A resource can also be an 
action or strategy adopted in adverse circumstances, which coincides with 
marginalized and oppressed people having to adopt coping strategies for 
the unjust situations they often find themselves forced into.  Yet, if agency 
is a constructed resource from which people may draw, how is it 
constructed? How do people know that it has been constructed and is now 
available to them in some way? 
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Conceptions of agency through a postmodernist lens are often 
bound to relationships and interactions.  In  “Agency as Emergent and 
Enacted,” Marilyn Cooper defines agency as “the process through which 
organisms create meanings through acting into the world and changing 
their structure in response to the perceived consequences of their actions” 
(2011 p.420).  People intentionally and voluntarily take action and then 
learn and change based on their interpretation of the situation.  She 
advances the notion that rhetorical agency emerges as subjects respond 
to environmental as well as internal perturbations that then lead to further 
disturbances in the environment and the subject.  In addition, Cooper re-
defines the notion of the subject as a responsible agent whose ability to 
effect changes in the world is a property resulting from the dynamic 
relationship between internal meaning-making processes, conscious and 
unconscious, and external stimuli.  In her model, action, intention, and 
effect may or may not occur as conscious pre-meditated decisions, but the 
subject remains responsible: “Rhetors – and audiences – are agents in 
their actions, and they are responsible for those actions, but they are not 
the sole cause of what happens” (Cooper, 2011 p.439).  The subject is not 
an autonomous agent in the conventional sense but a node in a network 
of forces: subjects’ short and long-term goals, emotions, intentions, 
actions, interpretation of external stimuli, learning, and continued 
introspection and circumspection.   “Agency is a matter of action,” Cooper 
contends, “it involves doing things intentionally and voluntarily, but is not a 
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matter of causing whatever happened” (2011 p.439).   This action was as 
important as taking social action.  While Cooper extends a definition of 
agency that incorporates external, environmental pressures among other 
things, there remains an emphasis, as Accardi mentions as well, on 
individual agency as something possessed, even if only at a given 
moment (2015 pp.1-5).  Also, unlike many other orientations and 
definitions of agency, Cooper ignores politics, omitting socio-economic 
constraints to agency such as those surrounding race, gender, ethnicity, 
sexual orientation, and class. In terms of activist inquiry and Addams, 
considering these things is important, especially since class conflict was 
much of her focus. 
We can neither be completely aware of who or what has influenced 
us to make a decision and take action nor who or what ultimately caused 
an effect.  While activist inquiry respects the varying perspectives on 
agency, the insistent focus on pinning down a definition has resulted more 
or less in a floating signifier – no universal agreed upon meaning.  Nor, 
and this is key to my argument, do most theories of agency adequately 
take up generating agency for social action.  How does an activist or a 
rhetorician facilitate, encourage, or even construct agency as a resource 




A Social Problem: Individualism and Democracy 
Addams did not use the word agency specifically; however, in 
Democracy and Social Ethics she is clearly concerned with the agentive 
role individuals (can and should) play in assuaging injustice and inequity.  
Addams forwarded the claim that if Americans value the democratic ideals 
of equality, diversity, tolerance, justice, and the common good, then the 
way in which an individual lives must be organized by socially-oriented 
inquiry, convictions, and actions.  “To follow the path of social morality” 
Addams claims, “results perforce in the temper if not the practice of the 
democratic spirit” (1902 p.6).  She wanted her readers to practice a social 
ethic, or what I refer to as simply being socially responsible.  This ethic 
begins with experience and aims for social action.  Her book argues for 
not only why they should enact it but also demonstrates putting it into 
practice, which helps to reinforce the importance of social action for a 
democracy.  Reciprocally, the more a person practices a social ethic, the 
more they understand its importance.  Essentially, she facilitates or 
encourages their sense of agency (as possession) and constructs it by 
showing readers how wide and varied experience affects knowledge and 
understanding.  Such experience, which future chapters explain in greater 
detail, also necessitates considering factors external to an individual or 
group that influence agency – the more postmodern view of agency where 
discourses and power relations come into play. 
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The challenge Addams felt she faced in convincing her readers to 
adopt a social ethic, and one that resonates with 21st century issues, 
pertains to individualism.  She observed that many people in her time, 
particularly the prosperous wealthy elites, practiced an individual rather 
than social ethic.  For Addams, this meant that they focused on securing 
financial and social stability for oneself and family, but generally ignored 
people from lower socio-economic neighborhoods such as the 
impoverished tenements of Chicago’s Halsted Street, where Hull House 
was situated.  This physical distancing between wealthier people and 
poorer people persists today, with the wealthiest segregating themselves 
away from the poorest.  Addams felt such people had either not felt the 
“social compunction,” or had “exhausted their moral energy in attaining the 
current standard of individual and family righteousness” (1902 p.25).  This 
is not to suggest that any kind of charity, aid, or assistance did or does not 
exist.  Rather, when compelled to aid others, a self-serving benevolence 
prevailed:  “The superior [prosperous, upper-class] person ought to take 
care of the inferior [poor, working-class] person and the inferior person 
ought to be grateful” (Knight, 2010 p.96).  The wealthy benefactor of the 
poor expected immediate and unfettered gratitude from the poor they 
aided and most of Addams’s readers, “prosperous people who could 
afford to buy books…, [were] comfortable in their superiority” (Knight, 2010 
p. 106), unlikely and unwilling to change their view of the less fortunate 
and learn how best to aid them.  Addams contends, however, that “to 
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attain individual morality in an age demanding social morality, to pride 
one’s self on the results of personal effort when the time demands social 
adjustment, is utterly to fail to apprehend the situation” (1902 p.3).  
Individual morality and social morality are not mutually exclusive; but, as 
Addams argues, privileging individualism can result in a willed ignorance 
of what the situation demands and misguided action, escalating the 
problem, silencing the lower-class, and reifying social injustice and 
inequality.  In other words, even if the upper class knew problems existed, 
their attempts to ameliorate them were often misguided and tended to be 
unsuccessful – at best not changing the situation and at worst aggravating 
it. 
As an example, in Democracy and Social Ethics, Addams describes 
a situation not unfamiliar to welfare and food stamp applicants today.  A 
poor woman needs a pair of shoes so that she “may go decently to mass, 
or to work” (1902 p.13).  A charity worker investigates the family, its 
income and expenses, not only to determine need but also to guard 
against fraud, fearful that a poor family may (or is likely to) hide income or 
exaggerate expenses and take advantage of the charity’s benevolence.  
The charity worker intimates that she and her husband ought to work more 
and does not provide what the visitor clearly has the resources to give: 
“Her most generous gift is considered niggardly, compared to what she 
might do.  She ought to get new shoes for the family all round, ‘she sees 
well enough that they need them’” (1902 p.13).  The charity visitor failed to 
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understand the situation and what it demanded: the family’s needs were 
not heard, silenced by unfeeling calculations.  If the poor woman needs 
the shoes for work and has no other pair, she may lose wages or be fired, 
exacerbating the family’s poverty.  The suspicion of deceit, a selfish 
wariness not to be deceived or to “waste” resources, overshadowed the 
charity worker’s ability to understand the situation more comprehensively.  
Selfish means to social action did not give way to efficacious, ethical 
outcomes - ones that identifiably affect helpful, beneficial changes and do 
not reinforce unjust situations. 
Similar problems exist in the 21st century.  Commitments to self, 
family, job, community, and nation compete with one another for attention 
and while individualism is not wholly a bad thing, it can hinder a broader, 
more inclusive view of a person’s social responsibility.  This is because it 
leans heavily on the autonomous self of the humanist view of agency: if a 
person chooses to work long, hard hours, they will succeed.  An 
individual’s choices, as limited by poverty, race, ethnicity and more, may 
not be considered.  What constitutes “hard work” is rarely defined, and 
success is generally thought of in terms of financial wealth.  Intermittent 
tides of political activism, various movements, and volunteerism indicate 
that many strive to uphold and strengthen social democratic values, but 
we are also still challenged by the Western proclivity towards individualism 
(coupled with Capitalist materialism) and its attendant selfishness, 
alienation, and divisiveness. The poor are often denigrated and there is a 
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general consensus among the middle to upper classes that their efforts 
and hard-earned money should not go towards aiding the less fortunate or 
reducing poverty.  This is a common belief that, just as in Addams’s time, 
the poor are in their position because of vice and laziness (1902 p.81).2 
The more fortunate feel superior to the less fortunate and arguments 
emerge against what has pejoratively been coined “Entitlement Programs” 
such as Welfare, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP 
or what was previously known as “Food Stamps”), and Medicaid.  
Intractable, unwavering socio-political positions on these social assistance 
programs as well as on gun control, women’s reproductive rights, 
immigration and more exclude other perspectives. This can result in a 
refusal to communicate, recognize, or understand disparate realities and 
make it difficult to sympathize and empathize with people who have 
different worldviews, contributing to a lack of understanding and ineffective 
social action. 
The Black Lives Matter Movement, begun in 2012, provides a good 
example of misunderstanding in the context of social action.  According to 
their website, “Black Lives Matter” means “broadening the conversation 
around state violence to include all of the ways in which Black people are 
intentionally left powerless at the hands of the state.  We are talking about 
the ways in which Black lives are deprived of our basic human rights and 
dignity.”  The Black Lives Matter movement gained momentum in 2015, 
but generated a host of misunderstandings.  Probably the biggest one is 
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with the name.  For many people, “Black Lives Matter” implied that other 
lives matter less: white lives and the lives of police officers in particular.  
The underlying sentiment, however, is that black lives matter just as much 
as other lives — black lives matter too.  A long history of systemic racism 
and discrimination in America shows that black lives have not mattered.  
The Movement’s power is diminished because of the misleading name, 
and in their confusion, many people who misconstrued the name called for 
“All Lives Matter,” which compounds the problem by “enshrining their 
misunderstanding” (Simon 2015).  Are those calling for “All Lives Matter” 
racist?  Undoubtedly, many people’s ideologies are entrenched in racism 
and bigotry but in this situation many are probably not racist, but have 
been remiss, or at the very least insensitive, in failing to consider the 
impact of different racial histories and cultural experiences: white and 
black.  In spite of efforts to clarify the name, many people still maintain that 
it should be “All Lives Matter” because “Black Lives Matter” is divisive and 
exclusionary.  As a result, the Movement “…finds itself preaching to the 
choir.  Those who get it - the ones who understand the name - are not part 
of the problem” (Simon 2015).  For those who do not understand, an 
unyielding position, reinforced by like-minded family, friends and 
communities (on and offline), supersedes a more socially-oriented ethic 
such as what Addams urges.  
The many parallels between the social issues Addams identifies in 
Democracy and Social Ethics and contemporary American society 
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suggests that this work warrants revisiting, and more specifically in terms 
of the strategies she employed to persuade others to agency and social 
action.  In their recent anthology on Addams continued relevance in the 
21st, Fischer, Nackenoff, and Chmielewski note that “scholars are finding 
startlingly fresh resources in Addams’s life and thought, applicable to 
contemporary challenges of war and peace, social and economic 
inequalities, and the responsibilities of citizenship” (2009 p.1). Also 
according to Nackenoff, “[Addams] had and expanded and deeper 
conception of citizenship and a wider definition of the political than we 
routinely encounter in American politics,” which have not yet been fully 
engaged with by recent scholarship (2009 p.119).  Much of this 
scholarship is in history, philosophy, and education however, and little 
work in Rhetoric and Composition specifically has focused on Addams3.  
Her social democratic philosophy, her push for a social ethic, is a fresh 
resource for discussions surrounding agency and social action.  More 
effective social change necessitates a more encompassing socially-
oriented worldview, which entails openness to experience, reflection, 
learning, and imagining ways to assuage and not reinforce unjust 
situations.  Being open to these, the idea then is to think of agency not as 
a term or as a metaphor but as an inventive process that draws upon 




Agency as Rhetorical Invention: Activist Inquiry 
What does it mean to say agency is a form of rhetorical invention?   
Invention is one of the five canons of rhetoric – invention, arrangement, 
style, memory, and delivery – and it is the only one, Lauer argues, “that 
directly addresses the content of the communication as well as the 
process of creation” (2004 p.1-2).  Paying close attention to how the 
process and the product interact in the context of encouraging people to 
engage in social action is important.  The goal of social action, the 
product, is to assuage an unjust situation, or as Fleckenstein defines 
social action: “any symbolic act aimed at redressing inequities” (2010 p.5).  
This goal represents a desire to have the intended effect of redressing 
inequities.  However, by what means or process may a social action goal 
be achieved?  Fleckenstein, I believe, rightly argues that “ends and 
means,” or product and process, “exist in a feedback loop, the one 
affecting the other” (2010 p.6).  Therefore, the process leading to a social 
action affects the outcome and if the process is not motivated by 
compassion and empathy for others, the outcome risks reinforcing the 
problem.  Addams would have agreed with Fleckenstein since she 
emphasizes the importance of experiential knowledge-building from a 
stance of sympathy and care.  Invention, in the context of social action, 
highlights this relationship between the process (approach or means) and 
the product (goal or outcome) of agency. 
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The nature, purpose, and epistemology of invention has a long, 
dense history in rhetoric; however, an explication of activist inquiry does 
not necessitate understanding all the issues in invention studies.  In fact, 
much of it would unnecessarily complicate the notion of agency as a form 
of rhetorical invention in the context of social action.  In her 
comprehensive review of invention in Rhetoric and Composition, Janice 
Lauer begins by describing invention as “historically encompass[ing] 
strategic acts that provide the discourser with direction, multiple ideas, 
subject matter, arguments, insights or probable judgments, and 
understandings of the rhetorical situation” (2004 p.2).  From a Platonic 
view, these things are “accessible by purely individual efforts” and 
“introspective self-examination” (LeFevre, 1987 p.11).  As LeFevre notes 
though in her seminal book Invention as a Social Act: 
This view does not allow for the individual’s interaction with and 
response to a world of people and things and symbolic forms; nor 
does it note how social and cultural features are embedded in each 
individual; nor does it show individual and culture are 
interdependent. (1987 p.25) 
In addition, “individual efforts” recalls those very same issues with 
individualism and the humanist view of agency mentioned earlier by 
encapsulating agency within a person.  Unlike the Platonic perspective 
though, contemporary theorists of invention look at an enormously vast 
array of things, arguing: 
…over what acts comprise invention (e.g initiating discourse, 
exploring subjects and situations, constructing texts or arguments, 
and interpreting texts)…over the purposes of these inventional acts, 
positing goals such as raising questions; reaching self-
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actualization; constructing new understanding, meaning, or 
judgments; finding subject matter; supporting theses; critiquing 
cultural codes; learning and creating disciplinary knowledge; 
interpreting texts and playing.  They have also argued over the 
types of strategies, tactics, heuristics, or guides that best facilitate 
invention, including the Pentad, the tagmemic guide, freewriting, 
the classical topics, [and more]. (Lauer, 2004 p.118-199)  
Activist inquiry does not claim to be comprehensive; however, many of 
these things are part of the process of inventing agency.  Following in the 
footsteps of Berlin and other scholars that argue for a social-epistemic 
rhetoric, activist inquiry finds: 
The real [as] located in a relationship that involves the dialectical 
interaction of the observer, the discourse community (social group) 
in which the observers is functioning, and the material conditions of 
existence.  Knowledge is never found in any one of these but can 
only be posited as a product of the dialectic in which all three come 
together. (1988 p.490).  
The questioning and curiosity of inquiry amidst these interactions ground 
the discovery and knowledge-building aspects of the invention of agency. 
However, “locating” and “finding knowledge” have been criticized 
for defining invention more narrowly as something that already exists and 
has yet to be discovered.  According to a more recent article by Yameng 
Liu, in classical rhetoric two definitions of invention have become so 
standard that scholars distinguish between them.  Invention is either the 
discovery of something or the creation of it: 
Semantically speaking, to “discover” is to make visible or known 
something that, though hidden and unknown previously, has always 
been “out there” … To “create,” on the other hand, suggest bringing 
into being something that has never before existed, some strange 
entity snatched ex nihilo… (2002 p.54) 
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 Discovery aligns well with a more interpretive or hermeneutical sense of 
invention: discovering underlying meanings and motivations that already 
exist.  Creation coincides with a production sense of invention.  Liu argues 
for a way to think about invention from another, less dichotomous 
perspective: what he calls “inventiveness” (2002 p.60).  Lui defines 
inventiveness as “striv[ing] for the new without attempting a clean 
severance with the old and to search for the unique through an 
identification with the common” (2002 p.60).  Activist inquiry, in some ways 
then, also aims to emphasize inventiveness in addition to social-epistemic 
roots.  It resummons the old, Addams’s knowledge and rhetorical 
strategies, in search of a different of thinking about and generating agency 
for social action. 
I offer the following working definition of activist inquiry: a non-
prescriptive, discovery-based approach to the invention of agency for 
social action.  At no point does a rhetor or activist demand that anyone 
take a specific social action.  Invention points to the generation and 
creation of ideas and possible actions.  Inquiry emphasizes the open, 
questioning, compassionate, and democratic stance needed for this 
generation.  Activist inquiry values Addams’s social ethic and recognizing 
the importance of wide experience among and with marginalized 
communities and people.  This experience is key to the knowledge-
building of activist inquiry, advancing understanding of the complex and 
often systemic causes of unjust situations.  This knowledge and 
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understanding can then be used to imagine the “what and where” of social 
action.  What actions could be taken to assuage an unjust situation? 
Where could and/or should this action take place for maximum 
effectiveness? 
Embedded in this definition is activist inquiry’s aim to overcome 
some of the challenges to agency and social action mentioned earlier: 
recognition of injustice, motivation to take action, and knowledge of the 
available avenues for effective social action.  How can an activist convince 
a resistant or merely indifferent audience to recognize their social 
responsibility?  How can they come to understand what it means to be 
socially responsible?  How can they be motivated to take social action? 
How can they know what action to take and where to take it?  As an 
activist, Addams had come to and answered similar questions on her own.  
She used what she learned and how she learned it (through particular 
experiences) to demonstrate why her readers, people of wealth and 
power, should become involved, possibly even become activists 
themselves.  Therefore, at points the act of inquiry rests on the shoulders 
of the activist and at other times upon the audience themselves.  
 
Research Questions 
1. How can thinking of agency as a form of rhetorical invention 
(activist inquiry) overcome some of the obstacles to social action?  
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2. What can Jane Addams’s Democracy and Social Ethics tell 
Rhetoric/Composition scholars about the invention of agency for 
positive, effective social action? 
 
Overview of Chapters 
Tracing a theoretical arc, the next three chapters explore how 
activist inquiry can overcome the challenges to social action: recognition, 
motivation, and avenues.  Chapter two begins with the challenge of   
convincing others, particularly the socially and economically privileged, to 
recognize their social responsibility.  Recognizing social responsibility is a 
process of becoming aware that requires work on the part of the activist 
trying to convince her audience as well as on the part of audience.  The 
audience is encouraged to work towards a kind of self-actualization or 
realization: acknowledging and understanding the import of being more 
socially responsible.  How Jane Addams approached this rhetorical task 
exemplifies the first part of activist inquiry.  Addams used specific, well-
informed knowledge of her readers, her upper-class peers, to create a 
socially responsible role for them within the text.  In rhetorical terms, she 
“addressed” and “invoked” her audience (Ede and Lunsford 1984).  
Although she already knew her audience well – their values, beliefs, and 
attitudes towards the lower-class – concerted, concentrated inquiry into 
audience is critical for convincing and/or persuading people, which are 
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neither synonyms nor mutually exclusive.  Some rhetoricians perceive 
persuasion as agonistically prescribing a stance that the audience must 
adopt. Convincing, as I use it, strives for a less agonistic, non-prescriptive 
approach similar to Addams’s.  While Addams would not have been 
familiar with the terminology, she employs identification through the 
rhetorical “we” as a key strategy for convincing her readers.  First, it 
prompts identification with her as a peer, an insider, as well as with the 
socially responsible role she creates.  Second, she uses “we” in 
conjunction with her extensive audience awareness to gently critique her 
readers for their hypocrisy, professing to value a social ethic while failing 
to act upon it.  This, I contend, can stimulate self-reflection and contribute 
to the recognition of social responsibility, which calls for engaged 
experience as the next part of activist inquiry. 
Chapter 3 takes on the next challenge to social action: motivation.  I 
argue that engaged experience can encourage motivation for agency and 
social action.  Engaged experience entails deliberate and purposeful 
interactions with marginalized peoples and communities and it is a key 
condition to inventing agency.  For activist inquiry, first, deliberate and 
purposeful interactions imply a rhetorical stance for interacting with others.  
I draw upon Fleckenstein, Ratcliffe, and Hamington’s feminist rhetorical 
methods of compassionate living, rhetorical listening, and embodied care 
as characterizing this stance.  Addams’s descriptions of her engaged 
experiences and what she learned from them demonstrate this stance and 
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how motivation work functions.  Furthermore, these feminist methods 
contribute to experiential inquiry and imagine ways of knowing and 
engaging with others that encourage a deeper understanding and 
identification with people enduring unjust conditions.  Such engaged 
experience reveals contradictions between preconceived notions and the 
reality marginalized, impoverished people face everyday. These 
contradictions, I argue, can build knowledge and empathy for people from 
less privileged backgrounds and can motivate others to action.  As Lee 
Artz puts it in his reflection “Speaking Truth to Power: Observations from 
Experience,” “social action arises in response to rhetorical appeals that 
address the life experiences of those affected” (2011 p.48).  The discovery 
and knowledge-building of engaged experience can motivate a person to 
engage even more and eventually perhaps, take on the agency needed 
for social action. 
In the fourth chapter, the challenge is devising appropriate and 
effective social action.  What actions are possible and are there places to 
take those actions?  I refer to this as imagining (a)venues for social action.  
These (a)venues are approaches, both idea and location, to assuaging an 
unjust situation without reinforcing it.  Engaged experience increases 
understanding of the situation, building useful knowledge for imagining 
what could be done (avenues) and in what place (venue) it can be done 
for maximum effectiveness, achieving the imagined goal.  I look to Royster 
and Kirsch’s notion of critical imagination and at how critical materialism 
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can contribute to imagining (a)venues for social action.  No one approach 
can be successful for all circumstances: however, continuous engaged 
experiences over an ever longer period of time increase the odds that an 
imagined (a)venue will successfully achieve its goal.  As in the previous 
chapter, I use Addams’s work as a prime example of this kind of engaged 
experience with the addition of noting how she used it to imagine 
(a)venues. 
In the final chapter, I sum up the process and characteristics of 
activist inquiry.  Activist inquiry attempts to tackle three challenges to 
social action: 1) recognizing social responsibility 2) knowledge-building 
and understanding for motivation and 3) imagining efficacious social 
action and where to take it.  While no methodology can encompass all 
aspects of a rhetorical situation, each step contemplates a few carefully 
and how various factors in the situation may be influenced in ways that 
can invent agency.  Also in this chapter, I consider the limitations of 
activist inquiry as I have theorized it.  A top-down model of activism 
assuredly has its problems; namely, the issue of power dynamics and the 
risk of misunderstanding and misrepresentation.  Finally, I briefly explore 






Many people are conscious of the need for social action that will 
assuage unjust situations.  Although they may not be well-versed in the 
theoretical underpinnings of systemic racism, most African American 
communities, for instance, are aware that racism perpetuates a vast array 
of inequalities and prejudices. Many others however, particularly those 
who occupy positions of privilege such as “white male” or “upper-class,” 
may not recognize an unjust situation, neither seeing nor understanding 
the issues marginalized and oppressed peoples face. This is a challenging 
recognition.  More than a century ago, Addams made a similar 
observation: “There are many people in every community who have not 
felt the ‘social compunction,’ who do not share the effort toward a higher 
social morality, who are even unable to sympathetically interpret it” (1902 
p.25).  In other words, these people do not sense the need to be (more) 
socially responsible.  Perhaps they do not understand what being a 
socially responsible citizen of a democracy entails.  Their sympathies – 
their feelings for others’ suffering – have not been awakened to the need 
for it.  Some may simply believe that there are other groups or 
organizations already addressing the issue.  They may not (fully) 
recognize, acknowledge and understand, their responsibility to others, 
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especially those in marginalized and disempowered groups, as a an 
ethical or moral imperative. 
This chapter explores the starting point for activist inquiry and how 
it begins to invent agency.  First, activist inquiry must overcome the 
challenge of convincing others to recognize their social responsibility, or 
what Addams refers to as “the social ethic.”  By social responsibility I 
mean sympathizing with others enough to value a democratic ethic of 
association, interaction, and engagement across ideological and 
worldview differences.  In particular, this is critical for sympathizing with 
others from different cultural, economic, and social positions, which 
construct these varying ideologies and worldviews.  Without a sense of 
social responsibility, an individual is less likely to feel compelled to 
understand and aid others in need.  Addams’s rhetorical approach in 
Democracy and Social Ethics demonstrates how to convince an audience 
to acknowledge the import of being socially responsible – why they should 
be (more) socially responsible – and what it entails.  Specifically, Addams 
uses detailed knowledge of her readers’ perceptions, misconceptions, 
beliefs, attitudes, and values to textually represent them in a way that 
encourages the recognition of an ethical obligation to the marginalized and 
oppressed.  Activist inquiry begins then with inquiring into a specific 
audience for the purpose of convincing them to acknowledge and enact an 
ethic of social responsibility.  As with any attempt at persuasion, audience 
awareness plays a crucial role in contributing to the effectiveness of an 
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argument.  Addams considered her intended readers, upper-class elites 
like herself carefully, and deployed what she knew to fictionalize them in a 
way that invites them to discover for themselves their social responsibility 
to others.  As I will show in this chapter, Addams used sympathetic 
descriptions that alternated between gently criticizing her readers and 
attentively positioning them as already having adopted a socially 
responsible role.  Addams hoped her readers would perceive their 
hypocrisy and adopt this role by becoming involved with lower-class 
communities: engaging with their people and learning how they could help 
lessen the injustices suffered by the marginalized and oppressed.  
However, she did not demand they take on this responsibility. She merely 
reiterated the importance of this social ethic and suggested ways to begin 
enacting it.  Such a non-prescriptive approach stresses what could be 
called facilitating, encouraging, and/or inviting acknowledgment of one’s 
social responsibility.  This approach is in contradiction to aggressive or 
agonistic rhetorical strategies that call for a person to accept the rhetor’s 
premise to be considered successful.  This non-prescriptive, less agonistic 
strategy is important for activist inquiry’s discovery-based approach to 
inventing agency. 
For the enactment of social responsibility, which will be the focus of 
the last part of this chapter, activist inquiry involves recognizing that it 
requires sympathetically learning about others’ ideologies, worldviews, 
and lived experiences, especially those of marginalized, oppressed 
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peoples.4  This kind of inquiry necessitates personal, embodied 
experience, which Addams strongly urged; however, again, she did not 
want her readers to necessarily or blindly adopt her point of view (Knight, 
2010 p.107).  Instead, she focused on using her writing to help them 
discover and learn for themselves that “social perspective and sanity of 
judgment come only from contact with social experiences; that social 
contact is the surest corrective of opinions concerning the social order, 
and conceding effort, however humble for its improvement” (1902 p.6).  
Embodied experience is the most likely thing to result in understanding 
others and knowing what social actions to take for assuaging unjust 
situations.  Ironically, Knight points out, this means Democracy and Social 
Ethics is a book that “endors[es] the need to put down her book, or any 
book, and learn from life” (2010 p.107).  Nonetheless, she enacts a 
socially responsible ethic through the text, emphasizing the knowledge 
gleaned from the wide experience of being among and engaging with 
marginalized, impoverished communities and people. Her textual 
enactment helps explicate activist inquiry, but before anyone engages 
upon such experiences, people “must recognize and acknowledge the 





What is Recognition?: Acknowledgment  
Perception, identification, understanding, awareness, and seeing, 
among other concepts, surround definitions of  “recognition” and 
“recognizing.”  Recognition in the context of activist inquiry references all 
of these at one juncture or another, but specific to this chapter, recognition 
refers to the work required by an activist/rhetor to convince another to 
consciously acknowledge their social responsibility.  To acknowledge this 
requires convincing in the sense that Lunsford and Ruszkiewicz use it:  
“Convincing leads audiences to accept a claim or idea as true or 
reasonable,” which can lead to a sense of conviction.  This is in 
opposition, as they conceive it, to “persuading,” which moves people to 
action (2016 p. 159-160).  Convincing then is apt here as a first step to 
activist inquiry.  An individual acknowledges or accepts the general truth 
or reasonability of being socially responsible. They are convinced, which 
requires what I call “recognition work.”  Gee employs these terms as well 
in his linguistic analysis of identity.  Gee’s idea of “recognition work” is 
people engaging in a mental effort “to recognize others for who [identity] 
they are and what [activity] they are doing” (2006 p.29).  This notion of 
recognition work, he argues, encompasses “ways with words, actions, 
beliefs, emotions, values, interactions, people, objects, tools and 
technologies that come to constitute ‘being and doing’” (2006 p.29).  
Identity and activity come together for recognition.  Activist inquiry takes 
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into consideration actions, beliefs, emotions, values, interactions, and 
people; however, Gee was primarily concerned with social and cultural 
identities whereas recognition work here leans towards identification for 
acknowledgment of social responsibility.  This identification is an act of 
becoming, a process of identifying with the rhetor/activist and identifying 
with the socially responsible role she creates for them, as discussed later 
in the chapter. 
Interactions, emotions, values and beliefs are all important to a 
notion of understanding what recognition work requires.  All these and 
more influence whether someone recognizes their social responsibility and 
so it becomes important to attempt to understand those values and 
beliefs, as Addams exemplifies.  Activist inquiry aims to convince others to 
recognize the obligation to be socially responsible and this begins by 
carefully considering a specific audience’s beliefs, attitudes, and values 
surrounding their relationship (or lack thereof) with marginalized, 
impoverished, and oppressed people. 
 
Audience Addressed: Inquiring about the Reader 
Taking cues from Addams’s work, recognizing social responsibility 
in the context of activist inquiry requires the activist to have a particularly 
nuanced understanding of their target audience.  With Democracy and 
Social Ethics Addams anticipated, without doubt, a primary, ideal 
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audience of prosperous elites like herself, who could afford to buy books 
(Knight 2010).  Assuredly, others outside of this group read her book, but 
the focus here is her ideal audience. In their well-known article “Audience 
Addressed/Audience Invoked: The Role of Audience in Composition 
Theory and Pedagogy,” Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford’s audience 
groupings describe two traditional perspectives that help to tease out 
strategies for recognition work and clarify this first step.  They are 
“audience addressed” and “audience invoked” (1984 p.156).  These two 
concepts are reviewed in greater detail below, but for now, put simply, 
audience addressed is about what the writer/rhetor knows or can know 
about their audience.  With audience invoked the writer/rhetor creates who 
they want their audience to be – readers become a fiction the writer has 
made up.  She invents them.  Ede and Lunsford’s interest lies in critiquing 
audience addressed and audience invoked as too narrowly and 
dichotomously conceiving of the relationship between writer and audience.  
They argue instead for the dynamic relationship between writer and 
reader:  “A fully elaborated view of audience, then, must balance the 
creativity of the writer with the different, but equally important, creativity of 
the reader.  It must account for a wide and shifting range of roles for both 
addressed and invoked audience” (Ede and Lunsford, 1984 p.169-170).  It 
is questionable to what degree “a fully elaborated view of the audience” is 
possible.  It depends on the rhetorical situation but Addams was certainly 
in a position to know her readers well and have such an elaborated view 
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of her readers.  Activist inquiry agrees with this conceptualization of 
audience and writer, first noting the importance of understanding the 
audience’s beliefs, attitudes, and values as much as is possible.  This, 
audience addressed, informs audience invoked, and vice versa, and 
together activist inquiry uses them to non-prescriptively convince others to 
recognize (acknowledge and understand) their social responsibility.  In 
other words, by knowing a specific audience in enough detail, they may be 
invoked – created or invented in ways that convince and persuade but are 
not especially prescriptive, coercive, or antagonistic. 
Knowing the target audience well represents one of the first steps 
to recognition of social responsibility.  It contributes to the writer’s 
understanding of how readers’ beliefs and values as well as their 
rhetorical situation informs their actions.  Audience addressed  
“emphasiz[es] the concrete reality of the writer’s audience” and holds that 
“knowledge of this audience’s attitudes, beliefs and expectations is not 
only possible but essential” (Ede and Lunsford, 1984 p. 156).  This 
conception of audience aligns primarily with traditional rhetorical theory 
drawn from antiquity to the 18th century (Covino and Joliffe, 1995 p.13).  
In this view, a text’s audience is conceived as “some individual or 
collective ‘other’ whom the rhetor must identify, analyze in psychological 
and emotional terms, and then, by means of the text, ‘change’ in some 
way so that they will adhere to the rhetor’s central idea or thesis” (1995 p. 
13).  However, according to Covino and Jollife, many 
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Rhetoric/Compositionists criticize this view on at least three grounds:  
1) it limits attention to the primary audience, ignoring subsidiary and 
mediated audiences;  
2) it ignores the “shared, dialectical nature of communication by 
characterizing the rhetorical interaction as moving in one direction” 
from writer to reader and; 
3) it tends to “assume an antagonistic relation between the rhetor 
and the audience.” (Covino and Joliffe, 1995 p. 13) 
To address the first point, audience addressed (and invoked as 
well) depends on the readers the writer/rhetor consciously privileges 
during invention.  Addams appears to have largely ignored audiences 
beyond her target one: the upper-class.  Writers may attempt to take into 
consideration and appeal to secondary or tertiary audiences, but they are 
still likely to privilege their primary audience – those they feel are most 
likely to be convinced and/or persuaded by their argument.  Clearly, there 
is a power dynamic possible here.  If a writer approaches their task 
predominately from the audience addressed perspective, they may 
conceive of the interaction between writer and audience as moving 
primarily in one direction: from the writer to reader.   This one-way 
transmission calls to mind Freire’s banking model: the teacher fills his 
students with knowledge while they sit passively and absorb it all in 
(1970).  In this case, the writer sits in for the teacher as sender and the 




By ignoring the nature of communication, a writer could more 
readily slip into an agonistic tone, something activist inquiry aims to largely 
avoid if possible.  Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin are particularly critical of 
the agonistic issue – the third critique in the list.  They argue that it relies 
on defining rhetoric as persuasion, which they believe is problematic 
because it largely functions through a lens of patriarchal bias: dominance 
and power that attempts to change others (1995).  They see persuasion in 
this traditional sense to be coercively forcing the rhetor’s opinion on the 
audience.  For the writer’s argument to be considered effective or good, it 
must change readers in line with their persuasive goals and thereby the 
writer “gain[s] control and power over them” (Foss and Griffin, 1995).5  By 
this reasoning, if it “must change” readers, then it is oppressive and 
agonistic.  However, this implies that all persuasion is violent, coercive, 
and antagonistic. In “Beyond Traditional Conceptualizations of Rhetoric 
and a Move Toward Civility,” Bone, Griffin, and Scholz address this, 
contending that “under certain circumstances, to attempt to persuade is 
inappropriate, but [Foss and Griffin] do not say that persuasion, by its very 
nature, is always and only violent” (2008 p.438).  As an alternative, Foss 
and Griffin posit an invitational rhetoric, whose purpose is to “offer an 
invitation to understanding” (1995 p. 2).  In invitational rhetoric, 
perspectives are offered in a safe space that values equality and self-
determination.  It is somewhat unclear what such an ideal safe space 
would look like or how this would pertain to a speaker or a writer though.  
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Furthermore, power relations cannot be entirely neutralized in any 
situation. 
Convincing readers like Addams’s upper-classmen to value being 
socially responsible would be difficult if she adopted a more agonistic 
tone.  Admittedly, an antagonistic tone may be persuasive for a certain 
target audience, rallying them to support and action for a pre-existing 
belief, but it is not considered particularly effective for convincing a 
skeptical or resistant audience that a value claim is true or even 
reasonable. In other words, people are not likely to change their beliefs or 
perceptions if the tone of the argument becomes antagonistic and 
aggressive.  Certainly Addams hoped she could alter her readers 
perceptions, but she was “aware [they] would balk at the idea of violating 
the conventions of their social class” (Knight 2010 p.107) should they 
merely be asked to engage with poor communities.  Nonetheless, for 
Addams and for recognition work, there is value to be gleaned from both 
invitational rhetoric and the traditionally conceived notion of persuasion.  
Like audience addressed and audience invoked, rather than being 
mutually exclusive or diametrically opposed, they represent rhetorical 
options that together can be useful contributors to making an effective 
argument.  In their response to a variety of critiques to invitational 
rhetoric6,  “Beyond Traditional Conceptualizations of Rhetoric: Invitational 
Rhetoric and a Move Toward Civility,” Bone, Griffin, and Scholz note what 
invitational rhetoric does well: 
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The theory of invitational rhetoric speaks to the complexity of 
rhetoric and choices rhetors make as they use symbols to create 
and respond to messages.  It calls attention to the nature of change 
and the role of humans in creating change and asks scholars to 
consider the ethics of change; to ask ourselves, “At what point do I 
know what is best for another?” At times, that answer is clear – 
what is best is to prevent a racist, classist, sexist, homophobic 
act… (2008 p.457). 
Invitational rhetoric fills the gap when “knowing what is best” is not clear 
because inherent in its invitation to understand is giving people the chance 
to explain their perspective and their needs (Bone, Griffin, and Scholz 
2008 p.457).  Activist inquiry aims to foster understanding; therefore, 
giving people the opportunity to explain themselves to different others is 
important. 
While the next chapter will go into more depth on this subject, 
activist inquiry requires people to listen and try to understand other 
perspectives.  However, who listens to whom depends on the relationship 
between those engaged in an interaction, whether in-person or between 
writer/speaker and reader/audience.  Class, race, ethnicity and more are 
factors that influence whether one person listens to another and those with 
power and authority are less likely to truly listen to what the disempowered 
and impoverished have to say.  According to Addams’s accounts, her 
readers were not listening to them.  Nina Lozano-Reich and Dana Cloud 
look at “the complexity of rhetoric and the choices rhetors make” in such 
power relations (2008 p.457).  In their article “The Uncivil Tongue: 
Invitational Rhetoric and the Problem of Inequality,” their critique of 
invitational rhetoric is that it “presupposes conditions of economic, 
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political, and social equality between and among interlocutors; however, 
such conditions of actual equality are rare in political controversy and 
interpersonal relationships” (2009 p.220).  Those in most need of being 
heard have neither power nor authority.  Therefore, in all, invitational 
rhetoric like traditional persuasion has its drawbacks and its advantages. 
Addams’s argument can be viewed as both traditionally persuasive 
and invitational, which could be of use to activist inquiry.  In as much as 
Addams aims to convince her readers to live by the new democracy she 
defines, she is being persuasive.  Her readers should understand and act 
upon an ethic that values others as equals.  They should adopt a social 
ethic, but because Addams and her readers were of relative economic and 
social equality she had “listened” to their perspectives.  Therefore, the 
issue of equality Lozano-Reich and Cloud raise does not precisely apply 
to Addams.  She was part of the same social, economic, and political 
class as her target audience.  She employs more of an invitational rhetoric 
in the sense that she “never said specifically what people should do, 
wanting readers to make their own discoveries” (Knight, 2010 p.107).   In 
the context of recognition work, Addams’s knowledge of her readers 
(audience addressed), as will be explained more clearly in the next section 
on audience invoked, helped her incorporate invitational and persuasive 
moments in her argument.  Invitational rhetoric is furthermore appropriate 
for recognition work because it not only denotes a less prescriptive 
approach and therefore less agonistic, but also aligns well with Addams’s 
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positionality in relation to her audience.  Of course, relations in discourse 
communities are “in part defined by differences in knowledge, experience, 
and status – differences in power that endlessly shift within and across 
social contexts” (Mortensen and Kirsch, 1999 p.322-323).  Therefore, 
even within the discourse community of Addams’s fellow upper-classmen, 
there would have been shifting power relations.  Setting aside the issue of 
power differences related to gender7, having been raised in that 
community, Addams would have known how to more effectively convince 
and persuade someone who had relatively equal social and economic 
standing as herself. 
Addams’s position aided her understanding of their existing beliefs 
and attitudes, visual and rhetorical habits, and how to use this information 
to urge social responsibility.  Addams’s position was what Louise Knight 
recently referred to as the “insider” position.  An insider is someone that 
belongs to and understands a dominant group and its privileged ideology 
(RSA Keynote, 2016).  They are “inside” or belong to a group while an 
outsider does not.  Of course, as Knight notes, “everyone feels like both 
an insider and an outsider, depending on whom they are with and where 
they are at a given moment in a given day” (2016 p.2), but for Knight, and 
activist inquiry, the term “refer[s] to people’s relative social and political 
status, especially in regard to the dominant society” (2016 p.9).  Insiders 
are those who hold wealth and power.  “Outsiders” can mean someone 
who does not belong to a group or particular discourse community, say 
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“scholars” or “bikers,” but taking a cue from Stockdell-Giesler, “outsider” 
can also refer to marginalized groups who lack power (2016 p.7).  Addams 
was an insider-outsider in the sense that Knight and Stockdell-Giesler use 
it: someone “who advocates for the causes of [marginalized] outsiders, 
regardless of whether they were born outsiders or insiders” (2016 p.8).  An 
outsider can proffer new, useful ideas, “mak[ing] them natural forces for 
change” Knight contends, and the insider, by virtue of their power, can 
take social action that marginalized outsiders may not have access to 
(2016 p.2). 
As an insider, Addams knew her readers well enough to urge them 
towards feeling socially responsible for the well-being of the less fortunate.  
As an example of one key thing she knew about her audience and used to 
invoke them, as the next section details, she knew they believed 
themselves to be superior to the poor.  In Democracy and Social Ethics, 
she writes: 
Formerly, when it was believed that poverty was synonymous with 
vice and laziness, and that the prosperous man was the righteous 
man, charity was administered harshly with a good conscience; for 
the charitable agent really blamed the individual for his poverty, and 
the very fact of [the charity worker’s] own superior prosperity gave 
him a certain consciousness of superior morality. (1902 p. 9) 
Although she says “formerly,” her argument against the 
exaggerated individualism of her time and for an ethic of social 
responsiblity suggests that this actually describes the beliefs her audience 
held.  Because her readers were not poor, then they must be morally 
superior as well.  Even now in the 21st century this way of thinking, these 
48 
 
visual-rhetorical habits persist.  If a person is financially prosperous they 
must have worked hard and therefore deserve their success.  Going as far 
back as colonial times, a strong work ethic is seen as a moral and civic 
duty (2003 p.8).  If someone is not doing well financially, they must have 
failed to work hard enough because they chose vice, laziness, drinking, 
and a life crime.  This perspective has been called various names.  In 
Cara Finnegan’s overview of early American rhetorics of poverty, she cites 
William Ryan, calling it “blaming the victim” –“if one were poor, one had 
somehow caused that poverty, and Neil Betten, who identifies it as “the 
hostile view” (2003 p.10) Geoffrey Bateman refers to something similar in 
his exploration of writing center work at a homeless shelter.   He calls it 
“the homeless:” a discursive regime that “forever ties [a homeless 
person’s] sense of self to its cultural and material displacement” (2014 
p.62).  The hostile view treats poverty as a moral failing and “the 
homeless” describes a pervasive rhetorical habit that links a person’s 
identity to their lack of housing instead of to their humanness.  They are 
“the homeless” instead of, as one woman puts it, “Who I am is not 
homeless.  I’m a human being named Jessie” (Batemen 2014 p.61).  As 
previously mentioned, Addams had learned that poverty was not always 
the fault of the individual.  Citing socioeconomic and environmental factors 
as significant contributors to poverty throughout Democracy and Social 
Ethics, Addams hoped to convince her readers to recognize their 
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misconceptions and reframe their perceptions of the poor.  Addams used 
her insider knowledge to help affect this persuasion. 
Addams also knew her readers tended to think mostly of 
themselves and their limited spheres of interaction:  
We can recall among the selfish people of our acquaintance at 
least one common characteristic, – the conviction that they are 
different from other men and women, that they need peculiar 
consideration because they are more sensitive or more refined.  
Such people “refuse to be bound by any relation save the 
personally luxurious ones of love and admiration, or the identity of 
political opinion, or religious creed.”  We have learned to recognize 
them as selfish…[and] a narrowness of interest which deliberately 
selects its experience within a limited sphere… (7) 
This delves into inventing her readers, which is the subject of the 
next section, but this also exhibits her audience awareness:  explicitly, her 
readers recognize selfishness in others and tacitly they are asked to 
acknowledge it in themselves.  Much like our class-segregated 
neighborhoods today, most of Addams’s upper class readers were content 
to remain safely segregated within “a limited sphere,” physically distanced 
from impoverished areas of the city and selfishly refusing to recognize 
their social responsibility.  Addams contends that eventually this makes 
the people “contemptuous of [their] fellows” and “limit(s) the scope of 
[their] ethics” (1902 p.7).  Considering physical space in the city and how it 
affects people, David Fleming concurs: “Physical marginalization is both 
cause and effect of social, economic, and political marginalization” (2008 
p.189).  Addams’s readers were entrenched in what Barthes calls “the 
mythologies of (their) culture, its taken-for-granted realities.”  Addams 
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concedes that they “[have] become hardened into customs and habits” 
that are difficult to change (1902 p.9).  These mythologies, such as stories 
of individual vice and wickedness causing poverty, inhibited the ways in 
which the upper class perceived those in much less fortunate 
circumstances and inhibited their ability to recognize their social 
responsibility. Knowing the audience well can disrupt and destabilize such 
habits. 
Bringing the contemporary rhetoric of Fleckenstein to bear on 
recognition work helps to explain the depth of Addams’s audience 
awareness, how well she employed her knowledge, and how that helps to 
explain activist inquiry.  First, recognizing social responsibility necessitates 
that people become aware of injustice and the need for change.  
Fleckenstein claims that one of the central challenges to agency as it 
pertains to social action, and therefore to the recognition work of activist 
inquiry as well, is “perceiving the need for change” (2010 p.17).   As a kind 
of recognition, Fleckenstein focuses on ways of seeing as habitualized 
interpretation. She calls these “visual habits,” which can “work to prevent 
people from seeing the need for change” she argues (2010 p.26).  Visual 
habits are shaped by the interplay of the body (sight as a physiological 
act) with cultural conventions, which often “sink below the level of 
conscious awareness” (2010 p.23).  To use Fleckenstein’s example of a 
visual habit, her daughter unconsciously perceives images on a computer 
screen as opportunities to dismantle, mismatch, and de/re-contextualize 
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them.  They are unstable, meaning they can be changed to reflect other 
meanings.  Fleckenstein, on the other hand, sees images as invitations to 
interpret and critique (2010 p.24). They are stable, unchanging artifacts.  
These are two ways in which images are interpreted and interacted with 
differently. 
While this example does not refer to social action, it demonstrates a 
habitual way of seeing and interpreting something: recognizing images as 
“stable” or “unstable.”   In the context of social action and activist inquiry, 
such visual habits can hinder recognition of social responsibility.  Visual 
habits represent obstacles to recognition because they are ways of 
thinking about what is seen that are hard to change.  Such habits have to 
first be consciously acknowledged; otherwise, the visual habit is 
automatically triggered.  Regularly, a homeless man slumped down on the 
sidewalk is mentally dismissed and ignored, perhaps on the grounds that 
he is just one more lazy drug addict.  The posters a homeless youth 
advocacy group positioned on the street give an example of disrupting 
such a visual habit. One poster reads, “If this poster were a homeless 




Figure 2.1 Homeless Youth Advocacy poster 
 
Unlike a homeless person, the poster is hard to ignore, being in a 
strange position, halfway up the wall and halfway on the street, and 
standing out white against the grey sidewalk. It appeals to the person 
seeing and reading it to reconsider their usual willingness, their visual 
habit, to simply ignore homelessness.  Visual habits then offer a way of 
thinking about how recognition of social responsibility could occur or could 
be encouraged by disrupting them and making people more aware of their 
role in perpetuating injustice. 
For Addams’s readers, the upper-class neighborhoods and 
business districts – these physical places – impacted how the they saw 
and spoke about the lower-class, their visual and rhetorical habits.  They 
could be segregated from them, as mentioned before, interpreting the 
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lower-class through the lens of privilege, as in the case of Addams’s 
charity worker.  At first, she expects those she is aiding to have the same 
frugal and industrial values with which she was raised.  She soon learns 
that these don’t transfer well to people whose worries are not saving 
money or not working enough, but simply focused on day-to-day survival 
(1902 p.12-19).  Addams writes, “there is a narrowness of interest which 
deliberately selects its experience within a limited sphere,” and 
“consciously limiting our intercourse to certain kinds of people whom we 
have previously decided to respect…limit[s] the scope of our ethics” (1902 
p.6-7).  As she puts it more succinctly, “Social ethics is not attained by 
traveling a sequestered byway” (1902 p.6).  The implication here is that 
her upper-class audience has done just this and their conduct “has 
become hardened into customs and habits” (1902 p.9).  Their lack of a 
wider experience has informed their values and actions.  Visual and 
rhetorical habits, as Fleckenstein argues, construct individual and 
collective normative perceptions and interpretations, in this case of the 
less socially and economically fortunate.  They are lazy and immoral for 
example.  Discourses and cultural structures have constructed their 
identities.  Visual and rhetorical habits having been set by cultural 
discourses contributed to Addams’s readers not acknowledging and 
understanding their social responsibility.  This hindered their belief in 
agency, their willingness to take social action, and their knowledge about 
what best to do to alleviate recognized social injustices.  Visually they did 
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not see, in person, bodily the lower-class because rhetorically the growing 
contempt for the poor and their own sense of superiority diminished their 
willingness to leave their neighborhoods, experience difference, discover, 
and learn: precisely what Addams hoped they would do. 
Knowing her readers, audience addressed, forms an adaptive base 
for creating the role she hoped to convince her readers to adopt.  This 
means she adapted what she knew about her audience and chose more 
effective rhetorical strategies for constructing or creating, what is referred 
to as audience evoked, her readers in the text itself.  The concrete reality 
of an audience will always be incomplete, gathered as it is through the 
lens of the rhetor’s experiences, the dominant ideology, and to recall the 
postmodernist perspective, their fragmented self.  In other words, the 
rhetor can never know everything there is know or everything they should 
know about their audience.  However, through inquiry into the audience 
and the knowledge it gleans, a rhetor can construct them in more specific 
ways to more specific ends.   In the case of activist inquiry, audience 
addressed and audience invoked can be integrated for the purposes of 
convincing those who are more economically, socially, and culturally 
fortunate to acknowledge and eventually understand their social obligation 




Audience Invoked: Composing the Reader 
Audience addressed provides critical information for invoking an 
audience, which describes the other perspective on invention and 
audience important to the next step to acknowledging social responsibility.  
Audience invoked does not deny the reality of the audience but stresses 
that the audience is a construction of the writer - a created fiction.  Walter 
Ong goes so far as to say “The writer’s audience is always a fiction.”  In 
the purest sense of audience invoked, the writer’s task is not to know the 
audience or to analyze it.  From their knowledge of visual and rhetorical 
habits, of the cultural discourses that dominate their audience, a rhetor 
invents, composes, creates, fictionalizes the reader.  However, as Ede 
and Lunsford argue, audience addressed and audience invoked are 
neither dichotomous nor contradictory, as they are often positioned in 
traditional rhetoric: 
The addressed audience, the actual or intended readers of a 
discourse, exists outside of the text.  Writers may analyze these 
readers’ needs, anticipate biases, even defer to their wishes.  But it 
is only through the text, through language that writers embody or 
give life to their conception of the reader.  In so doing, they do not 
so much create a role for the reader – a phrase which implies that 
the writer somehow creates a mold to which the reader adapts, as 
invoke it. (1984 p.167) 
The writer, in having investigated their audience, appeals to them, or as 
Ede and Lunsford put it:  “writers conjure their vision – a vision which they 
hope readers will actively come to share as they read the text” (1984 
p.167).  In a similar vein that may help to clarify the relationship between a 
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writer’s integrated use of audience addressed and audience invoked, in 
his work on narrative theory, James Phelan describes  “the recursive 
relationship (or feedback loop) among authorial agency, textual 
phenomena (including intertextual relations) and reader response” (2007 
p.4).  More concisely put, there is a “feedback loop among author, text, 
and reader” that includes how well an author knows their audience and 
how they use that information to invoke, or fictionalize, them (2007 p.5).   
As already well detailed above, Addams understood the existing 
beliefs, attitudes, expectations, and entrenched habits of her readers quite 
well, having lived and socialized among them since birth.  She knew their 
visual and rhetorical habits and their cultural discourses, considering them 
carefully as she composed her readers.  With her knowledge, Addams 
could more accurately depict her readers and therefore invite 
acknowledgement and better understanding of social responsibility: why it 
is important and what is means to be socially responsible.  As a result, 
and strategically using the rhetorical “we,” she sympathetically 
describes/constructs them, convincing them of their social responsibility by 
inviting them to discover themselves in her descriptions: both critical and 
kind.  Her critiques are implicit, however, and point out some of their 
misconceptions about what it means to live democratically.  In all, 
Addams’s use of “we” to invoke her audience prompts identification 
between writer and reader and of commonalities that inspire 
acknowledgment specifically of social responsibility.    
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The rhetorical “we” may seem insignificant, but it can foster 
identifications that when used in conjunction with creating a fictional 
audience promotes acknowledgment of social responsibility.  Of course 
“we” is always an invitation for the reader to identify with the writer/rhetor 
and her views: a Burkean perspective on identification where “A” identifies 
with “B” based on a shared commonality(ies) (1969 p.21).  In general, 
Addams’s readers could identify with her as an insider, among the upper-
class like themselves.  This identification creates a more credible, 
trustworthy ethos for Addams but with “we” she also constructs readers 
who already share her point of view.   “We know, at last,” she says, “that 
we can only discover truth by a rational and democratic interest in life and 
to give truth complete social expression is the endeavor upon which we 
are entering” (1902 p. 7).  Through the “we,” she claims that her readers 
know and believe that discovering truth (knowing reality) requires sensible 
thinking and the desire to learn about others’ lives.  “A rational and 
democratic interest in life,” which means identifying with all sorts of people 
represents a truth Addams and her readers have in common and 
encourages them to identify with a socially responsible role (1902 p. 7).  
The fictional audience Addams creates recognizes their responsibility to 
others and by using “we,” Addams avoids positioning herself as removed 
from her upper-class audience.  She does not “talk down” to them as 
though they are the problem and she (has) the answer.  The “we” 
encourages readers to consider adopting the ethos she hopes they will - a 
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person who practices democracy as social ethics: “We are thus brought to 
a conception of democracy not merely as a sentiment which desires the 
well-being of all men, nor yet as a creed which believes in the essential 
dignity and equality of all men, but as that which affords a rule of living…” 
(1902 p. 6).  By claiming that they are already moving towards a more 
social ethic, she is not describing reality but speaking more as a prophet 
Knight says, “painting a vision in order to inspire those listening to make it 
manifest” (2010 p.112).  In the context of convincing readers to 
acknowledge their social responsibility as part of living Democratically, 
creating an audience as if it already exists with “we” advances 
identification between the writer and the reader.  This can unite the 
rhetor’s recognition goal and the audience’s sense of who they are and 
who they want to be(come). 
A problem from this Burkean perspective of identification, finding 
commonalities, is that the rhetorical “we” can also be seen as coercing 
identification, obliging a reader to adopt the writer’s position and the role 
she has shaped for them.  This recalls the critique of audience addressed 
as antagonistic persuasion mentioned earlier.  Krista Ratcliffe, in 
particular, finds Burke’s conception of identification coercive and limiting: 
“As a place of common ground, Burke’s identification demands that 
differences be bridged.  The danger of such a move is that differences and 
their possibilities, when bridged, may be displaced and mystified” (2005 
p.47, 53).   In searching for common ground, Ratcliffe believes that 
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compromises are made and potentially productive differences thrust aside.  
However, finding commonalities remains important.  Addams’s “we” 
creates common ground and does presuppose unity of experience in this 
specific case, which can be problematic and coercive, but it also 
emboldens the emotional appeal of solidarity and togetherness that can 
motivate change and social action.  Furthermore, Addams thought of 
diversity as one of the central values of democracy and did not aim to 
exclude difference.  In fact, that is precisely what she wanted her readers 
to do for the new democracy: adopt a rhetorical stance of sympathetic 
openness, which will be described in detail in the next chapter, to 
difference in general and to the marginalized and impoverished more 
specifically. 
As Addams constructs her readers she tacitly critiques them, a 
rhetorical strategy that invites personal reflection and possible recognition 
of social responsibility.  The implicit critiques function as a way of letting 
her readers know she understands their perspective: “we blame them not 
for the will which chooses to be selfish, but for a narrowness of interest 
which deliberately selects its experience within a limited sphere” (1902 
p.7).  With this statement, Addams indicates that she and her readers 
don’t blame people for being selfish and overly individualistic but they do 
fault them for not broadening the scope of their experiences.  Implicitly, 
though, she is critiquing her audience for their selfishness and for living 
their lives from an ethic that privileges self, close family and friends over a 
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social ethic that calls for a broader view of moral obligation to others.    
This underlying criticism invites a kind of introspection where the reader 
may ask themselves if this describes them – not necessarily, but possibly.  
On the other hand, it does not overtly accuse, as in using “you” or “they” 
would: “You are selfish” for example.  These implicit expressions of 
disapproval are less antagonistic in their attempts to convince an audience 
to acknowledge social responsiblity.  In another example, she says, “We 
have learned since that time to measure by other standards such as social 
virtues, intellectual aims, and public commitments in addition to business 
acumen” (1902 p.9).  This characterizes her audience as well-intentioned 
while clearly insinuating that they previously have - and may still have - 
visual/rhetorical habits about the poor that limit their ability to recognize 
social responsibility.  At one point, Addams faults those who feel good 
knowing about the poor and various social wrongs through newspaper 
articles and literature, but do not actually do anything to remedy the 
problems (1902 p. 7).  Again, she only implicitly refers to her readers who 
may very well do this, but she immediately follows the criticism with an 
acknowledgement that this “wide reading of human life” has contributed to 
“find[ing] in ourselves a new affinity for all men” (1902 p.7).  In so doing, 
she softens her allegation. 
The recognition work of activist inquiry then attempts to emotionally 
disrupt her readers’ habituated beliefs, values, and attitudes by pointing 
out their hypocrisy: “we suffer from the strain and indecision,” she says, “of 
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believing one hypothesis and acting upon another” outdated set of ideas 
(1902 p.9).  Implicit critiques soften what otherwise might be perceived as 
more agonistic persuasion, and they non-prescriptively urge reflection on 
the enactment of personal values. 
 
Social Responsibility and the Need for Engaged Experience 
Shaping an audience that acknowledges the value of being socially 
responsible in a democracy moves them closer to understanding what this 
role calls for in terms of action.  While this will overlap somewhat with the 
next two chapters, experience is key to recognition work and activist 
inquiry in general because it can foster discovery, reflection, and 
knowledge-building.  I will just touch on experience here as an extension 
of acknowledging social responsibility. 
Experience was key to Addams’s philosophy and as argued above, 
experience with her readers helped her to know and construct them in a 
way that could lead them to acknowledge why they should be socially 
responsible (I.e. value a social democracy).  Experience can also show 
how to begin enacting that social responsibility - interaction and 
engagement with the marginalized, oppressed, and impoverished.   In his 
argument for engagement across and about faith and worldview 
difference, John MacLean develops a distinction between “interaction” and 
“engagement” useful for defining experience in the context of activist 
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inquiry.   He uses “engagement” to signify “back and forth communication 
between persons or groups that is intentional and often planned…” while 
“interaction” is broader, including engagement, but referring more 
generally to communication that “just happens” (2015 p.5).  For Addams, 
“Those who desire [a social morality] must be brought in contact with the 
moral experiences of the many in order to procure an adequate social 
motive” (1902 p.6).   Addams does not distinguish between interaction and 
engagement; however, her work at Hull House, from which she drew 
some of her descriptions for Democracy and Social Ethics, suggests 
intentional discussions and planned activities were a critical component to 
understanding the needs of the poor community.  The Working People’s 
Social Science club was formed, for example, where weekly lectures on 
topics such as strikes, socialism, and even “The Negro Problem,” were 
planned: one hour for the lecturer, one hour for the audience to question 
the speaker.  Questioners were limited to five minutes and a firm policy of 
tolerance was enforced (Knight, 2005 p. 205). 
Those who want to be socially responsible citizens of a democracy 
need to engage with the lived experiences of those outside their circles of 
affluence, comfort, and familiarity.  Addams describes her experiences 
and those of the relationships she analyzes throughout the text, but in the 
introduction, during the strongest address and invocation of audience, she 




• We are learning that a standard of social ethics is not attained 
by traveling a sequestered byway, but by mixing on the 
[metaphorical] thronged and common road where all must turn 
out for one another, and at least see the size of one another’s 
burdens. (1902 p.6) 
• …experience gives the easy and trustworthy impulse toward 
right action… (6) 
• We have learned as common knowledge that much of the 
insensibility and hardness of the world is due to the lack of 
imagination which prevents realization of the experiences of 
other people. (7) 
• …by our daily experience we have discovered that we cannot 
mechanically hold up a moral standard, then jump at it in rare 
moments of exhilaration when we have the strength for it…”(6) 
Experience as interaction and deliberate, not merely spontaneous, 
engagement with people’s ordinary experiences across class barriers 
furthers understanding of the marginalized and impoverished and the 
wrongs they suffer.   For example, my husband Matt works at a major fast 
food chain.  By all accounts, he is however middle-class and financially 
secure, his income supplementing my own.  Many of his coworkers, 
working for minimum wage, are barely able to provide for basic 
necessities.  While it can be argued that he is spontaneously interacting 
with his lower-class coworkers, and he certainly improvises, he 
consciously engages in a mission to understand them and the struggles 
they face.  He wants to help however he can.  One young woman he 
works with, Sam, works two part-time minimum wage jobs and still 
struggles to support herself and her children.  Matt listens, inquires, and 
learns that she struggles to keep food in the fridge and that they live in an 
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apartment with barely any furniture, no TV, computers, or tablets, and no 
toys or books for her 6-year-old daughter.  So when we swept through our 
childrens’ bedrooms for unwanted toys, he thought of giving some of it to 
Sam.  She and her daughter were ecstatic, feeling like it was a Christmas.  
She could otherwise not provide for her daughter and they stayed up till 
4am playing with toys and reading books.  Through deliberate 
engagement at his workplace, Matt perceived the direness of their 
circumstances and a key moment realized he could do a little something 
to help.  He sympathized with her and having been homeless once 
himself, empathized with her struggles.  Experience is so critical to activist 
inquiry and at this juncture it aims to begin moving the audience beyond 
the “lack of imagination,” beyond sympathy and towards the empathy that 
engaged experience can foster.  Sympathy and empathy can be thought 
of as different forms of recognition: one more deep and heartfelt than the 
other.  These two terms are often used interchangeably in situations 
where someone wants to ease another’s pain and suffering; however, they 
are neither exact synonyms nor mutually exclusive.  Although working in 
the social sciences Brene Brown explains the difference between 
sympathy and empathy in a way that resonates with activist inquiry: 
“Sympathy drives disconnection” and “empathy fuels connection.” 
Sympathy cannot be entirely divorced from pity, which often has a 
negative connotation.  Even Addams says that “pity is capricious, and not 
to be depended upon” (1902 p. 120 ).  Sympathy recognizes somebody’s 
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emotional or physical feelings given a particular situation, but it is remote 
and detached.  It looks outward from the self, regarding a situation from a 
distance either due to lacking a similar experience or because of a desire 
to distance oneself from the situation, while still being polite and 
expressing care for another.  Brown gives an example to distinguish 
between the openness of empathy and the more restrictive sympathy.  A 
person literally or figuratively falls into a pit and says, “I’m stuck. It’s dark. 
I’m overwhelmed.”  An empathic response would be “I know what it’s like 
down here and you’re not alone” while a sympathetic response merely 
acknowledges that a bad thing has happened.  Brown says: 
Empathy is feeling with people…Empathy is a choice and it’s a 
vulnerable choice because in order to connect with you, I have to 
connect with something in myself that knows that feeling. Empathy 
on the other hand connotes sharing and understanding somebody’s 
emotional and physical feelings/situation.  Empathy looks inward, 
drawing upon similar personal experiences for emotional 
understanding and using it to guide actions that help another 
person emotionally. (2014) 
Empathy requires perspective taking, remaining non-judgmental, and 
recognizing emotion in another and communicating it.  It is important to 
the recognition of social responsibility because it deals with how we 
understand and relate to others in ways that try to assuage their pain and 
suffering - products of injustice - and do so without causing more harm.  
Fleckenstein mirrors Brown’s explanation of empathy with her notion of 
compassionate living, which entails being “vulnerable and responsive to 
the undeserved pain of another” (2010 p.13) and “the suffering of another 
is not separate from self but intimately intertwined with one’s own well-
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being” (2010 p.5).  Imagining community as interconnected asks people to 
see others and their work as valuable and important.  Working from 
sympathy towards empathy by way of engaged experience supports 
Fleckenstein’s notion of compassionate living but also aligns with 
Addams’s push for a socially focused conception of democracy.   
In her argument for claiming Addams was a feminist pioneer whose 
philosophy resonates with standpoint epistemology, Hamington contends, 
“Addams linked social identification, social expression, and democracy 
together.  Members of a vibrant democracy not only recognize diverse 
standpoints, they must use empathy and effort to understand these 
diverse standpoints” [emphasis in the original] (2009 p.55).  Addams 
undertook this challenge by living in an impoverished community, 
establishing Hull House as a base.  Activist inquiry too must be grounded 
in such engaged experience, promoting discovery, reflection, and learning, 
but that is more the subject of the next chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
Once the audience has acknowledged the value of being socially 
responsible and they understand that it entails interacting and engaging 
with people from different cultural, economic, and social situations, the 
audience can begin to learn from their experiences and to recognize that 
they have misunderstood the situation, whether that misunderstanding is 
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one of not acknowledging that something is true or not understanding the 
rhetorical reality of a situation.  They may even perceive their own fallibility 
and humbly decide to make personal changes.  For Addams: 
Mistakes are opportunities for growth and worth the risk of active 
engagement.  In the process of crossing class and cultural 
boundaries—moving from the familiar to the unfamiliar—there are 
bound to be mistakes made, but if they are done in the spirit of care 
and with humility, then the errors are not insurmountable and have 
the potential to be great teachers. (Hamington)  
Initially, for example, Addams furnished Hull-House in the fashion of the 
high culture she was familiar with but later recognized that the finery and 
artwork fostered class alienation so she replaced them with simpler 
furnishings (Hamington).  The Social Science Club mentioned earlier was 
particularly educational for the House’s middle-class guests: “dry abstract 
social theories were transformed by personal stories and articulate 
arguments into vital questions” and “In a city whose social life was rigidly 
structured around class and where many middle-class citizens only knew 
about socialism and unionism from sketch newspaper reports and 
magazine article, the club broke barriers” (Knight, 2005 p.205).  Through 
such learning opportunities and others, acknowledging mistakes and 
making changes means ideas can and should change, evolving with the 
times to meet the needs of a democratic society.   Recall, Addams says 
that “ideas pass through a course of development.” 
To sum up this stage of activist inquiry, an audience must 
acknowledge their responsibility to those less fortunate than themselves 
as the charge of living in a democracy that values equality, diversity, 
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tolerance, justice, and the common good.  The inquiry in invention is about 
questioning.  For recognition work, it’s the questions rhetoricians ask 
themselves about who the audience is, and the answers they arrive at that 
work to convince readers to question their values and beliefs.  In an 
attempt to accomplish this acknowledgment, a writer/rhetor needs to 
undertake an in-depth investigation into a specific audience with the goal 
of understanding their beliefs, values, and attitudes towards different 
others: those they hope readers will interact and engage with.  What are 
their visual and rhetorical habits and how are they affected by place? The 
knowledge gleaned from this inquiry can be used to invent the audience 
as already inhabiting the role of a socially responsible individual.  How can 
a rhetor encourage them to examine their values and consider whether 
they are acting upon them or merely professing them?  Can implicit 
critiques accomplish this?  “We” pushes for identification with the writer, 
but as readers resist the coercion to unite with the writer’s ideas, there is a 
chance they will identify with the implicit critiques.  Still, such critiques 
have a chance because they invite instead of demand the reader to 
examine their values in relation to their actions and to possibly recognize 
disparities.  The inconsistency between their values and actions can 
cause an emotional disruption and lead to accepting their fallibility and 
revising their behavior.  Admittedly, this will in no way happen to every 
person, in every instance and perhaps the chance is indeed small.  Even 
Addams knew she certainly could not convince everyone, but just one 
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person can make a difference, as she herself had.  If convinced, the 
audience/reader (re)creates themselves, adopting the role the writer has 
created.  They take individual agency through this decision but also 
acknowledge the social, material, economic, and ecological influences on 
that agency such as their segregation from others of different cultural, 
economic, and social positions.  There is an implicit invitation to be(come) 
an insider-outsider and an explicit indication of how to be(come) socially 
responsible, persuading an audience to broaden their experience, 
including a wider diversity of people and places from which they can 







Knowledge emerges only through invention and re-invention, 
through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry human 
beings pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other. 
— Paulo Freire (1970) 
 
We are under a moral obligation in choosing our experiences since 
the result of those experiences must ultimately determine our 
understanding of life. 
 — Jane Addams (1902) 
 
 
In Democracy and Social Ethics Addams brought her own experiences 
among the marginalized, oppressed, and impoverished to her readers, 
hoping they too would seek out similar engagements.  Experience 
changed her perspective and the knowledge and understanding she 
garnered thus motivated her to 1) engage closely with poverty-stricken 
communities and people and 2) take social actions to lessen the injustices 
the people suffered.  In activist inquiry, such motivation is critical to 
agency and social action and a step between acknowledging social 
responsibility and taking action to assuage unjust situations.  Motivation is 
the desire or willingness to do something and at this stage in the 
inventional process represents a challenge because acknowledging social 
responsibility does not necessarily mean an individual will agentively 
interact and engage with marginalized communities and people.  This is 
especially true of outsiders to a community, like Addams was initially.  
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Furthermore, feeling socially responsible does mean an outsider will 
engage in ways that are beneficial, either for increasing their own 
understanding of a situation or for the betterment of those affected by 
unjust situations.  Experience plays a key role here as a tool of inquiry, 
providing opportunities for asking questions, making discoveries, and 
learning about other people, places, and cultures.   Addams emphasized 
experience throughout all of her work, and in Democracy and Social 
Ethics, she actually enacts her argument for the importance of experience 
by describing her own and how they “procured [for her] an adequate social 
motive” (1902 p.6).  Experience “gives the easy and trustworthy impulse 
toward right action” (1902 p.6) and she believed “wide experience 
carefully interpreted” could do the same for her readers (2010 p. 107).  If, 
as she says, “a lack of imagination prevents…a realization of the 
experiences of other people,” then one of the goals with her text was to 
ignite that imaginative capacity (1902 p.7).  Experience functioned like an 
inductive research method that motivated Addams and she felt it could 
motivate her readers to engage with marginalized communities and 
people. 
This chapter focuses on the motivation component of activist inquiry 
and how particular types of experience can prompt it for the invention of 
agency and social action.  Embodied and deliberate experience has a 
greater possibility of inspiring motivation to take social action.   
Characterizing these experiences as “deliberate” means they are engaged 
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experiences.  A person decides to engage with others from a specific 
stance, frame of mind, or attitude appropriate for marginalized 
communities and people.  Addams’s descriptions of her own experiences 
and observations as she lived among the impoverished tenements of 
Halsted street provide examples of not only what engaged experience 
entails but also what can emerge from it:  knowledge building, 
understanding, and motivation for social action.  Therefore, while her 
descriptions function on one level to inform her readers’ understanding of 
various situations they also endorse putting the book down and 
broadening their experiences.  Ultimately, if engaged experience is 
practiced with an open, sympathetic rhetorical stance, it has the potential 
to reveal emotionally disruptive contradictions that can build knowledge of 
and empathy for people from different social, economic, and cultural 
situations.  This empathy then has the possibility of motivating people to 
agency and social action.  This approach resembles some contemporary 
feminist rhetorical and epistemological methods such as Ratcliffe’s 
rhetorical listening and Hamington’s embodied care.  These methods 
explore sympathetic and empathic ways of knowing and engaging with 
others that aim to increase understanding, something critical to Addams’s 





In the context of activist inquiry, what is referred to as motivation 
work signifies the physical and/or mental effort to inspire in oneself or in 
others the will to engage with marginalized communities in ways that 
generate knowledge and understanding of unjust situations.  Therefore, 
motivation work may be either the activist’s efforts, such as those of 
Addams, or the work of those she is aiming to convince, her readers.   
Addams’s descriptions serve a motivational purpose as do her readers’ 
own engaged experiences.  Motivation work should not be confused with 
agency itself, but they are related.  If someone is judged as having 
exhibited agency through their actions (I.e. caused or contributed to an 
intended effect) they were motivated by something(s), someone(s), and/or 
some situation(s).  These are not mutually exclusive contributors to an 
action or to motivation and they tacitly signify a host of other factors 
specific to the rhetorical situations linked to motivating and enacting 
agency.  In rhetorical studies, one of the most commonly used means of 
examining what contributes to a person or people’s motivation is Kenneth 
Burke’s dramatistic pentad.  In his seminal book A Grammar of Motives, 
he opens with the question: “What is involved, when we say what people 
are doing and why they are doing it?” (1969 p.xv). For any human action, 
Burke finds, the attributing of motives requires 1) an act 2) performed by a 
person (agent) 3) for some purpose 4) within a situation or place (scene) 
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and 5) by some means (agency)  (1969 p.xv).  These are then formulated 
into an analytical tool whereby “Any complete statement about motives,” 
Burke observes “will offer some kind of answers to these five questions: 
what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it 
(agent), how he did it (agency), and why (purpose)” (1969 p.xv).   
At this point in activist inquiry, Burke’s pentad can be used to 
analyze any resultant social action and its motivation.  For example, 
because of Addams’s (agent) engagement with, say, an impoverished 
family (act), in their community and home (scene), she better understood 
(purpose) how poverty (agency) “impacts a family’s souls and minds” 
(Knight 2010, p.202).  Addams writes about a “little Italian boy of six,” who 
because of the extreme poverty in which he exists views life only from the 
narrow standpoint of his and his family’s struggle for food, clothing, and 
shelter (1902 p.17).  Or, as another more encompassing example, 
Addams describes how being poor has contributed to parents “tyrannically 
establishing habits of obedience” in their children, physically abusing them 
for disobedience.  This abuse stemmed from financial necessity as the 
parents,’ having no savings, needed their children to support them when 
they could no longer work (1902 p.17).  The parent expects this control to 
continue into the child’s adulthood and secure their survival into old age 
(1902 p.17).  Poverty, here, is agency as Burke defines it: a means 
towards an end, even if that end is not desirable.  Admittedly, it can be 
difficult to conceive of “the state of being extremely poor” as having 
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agency or as being a motivation, but the various affects on people 
suggests that it has agentive force in some situations.  As an insider-
outsider, or someone who was an outsider in poor communities but 
became an insider, Addams discovered and learned such things as those 
mentioned above, and recognizing the role poverty plays may motivate a 
person.  Burke’s pentad is primarily used as an interpretive or analytical 
tool to look at situations that have occurred, as demonstrated here, but 
motivation work needs to be primarily about production and invention.  
How can someone (agent) be motivated (agency) to (act) for social 
change (purpose)?  How was Addams motivated? How might her readers 
be motivated to have engaged experiences, to learn, to take action? 
 
Engaged Experience: The Right Rhetorical Stance for Motivation 
Work 
In terms of motivation work, engaged experience signifies more than 
merely experiencing a moment in time or an event.  It is similar to 
MacLean’s idea of engagement as the “back and forth communication 
between persons or groups that is intentional and often planned…” (2015 
p.5).  Intention distinguishes engagement from more broad forms of 
communication that occur by chance.  A planned meeting such as a 
community discussion about trash collection could qualify as engagement, 
but for motivation work, the planning of the event itself is less important 
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than the intention coming into an engaged experience.  Activist inquiry 
employs the idea of engagement as intentional communication but with 
the stipulation of embodied experiences with people from different cultural, 
social, and economic positions in their communities and from a stance of 
openness, thoughtfulness, and care.  These experiences occur with the 
conscious intent or choice - the agency - to discover and learn from 
purposeful interactions in much the same way that Addams herself had 
(Knight, 2005; 2010).  Engaged experience, put simply, calls for an open-
minded attitude or rhetorical stance.  Notably, Burke later modified the 
pentad to include attitude:  “‘Agency’ would more strictly designate the 
‘means’ employed in an act.  And ‘attitude’ would designate the manner.  
To build something with a hammer would involve the instrument, or 
‘agency’; to build with diligence would involve an ‘attitude,’ a ‘how’” (1969 
p.443).  For motivation work, engaged experience is defined as an 
intentional interaction during which an open-minded attitude, a specific 
rhetorical stance, is consciously and intentionally adopted when engaging 
with different others.  Fleckenstein’s compassionate living, Ratcliffe’s 
rhetorical listening, and Hamington’s embodied care inform the 
appropriate rhetorical stance for engaged experience.  However, before 
delving into what this stance means in more detail, I want to stress why it 
is so critical for engaged experience and the motivation work it does. 
First, as a mind-set, rhetorical stance suggests people’s visual and 
rhetorical habits: their unconscious ways of seeing and talking about 
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others and in the context of activist inquiry, the marginalized, oppressed, 
and impoverished in particular.  Because they are unconscious, these 
habits can be triggered and pose a problem for the intention behind the 
rhetorical stance of engaged experience.  Given the will, anyone can walk 
into an impoverished community, interact, and engage with its residents; 
however, that does not mean they will realize their responsibility to others 
or be motivated to assuage an unjust situation.  In fact, with the wrong 
mind-set, they may be repulsed or disgusted, falling back into inaccurate 
visual and rhetorical habits that adopt the hostile view of poverty as a 
moral flaw, “a sickness freely chosen through laziness, drinking, 
extravagance, and sexual vices” (qtd. in Finnegan, 2003 p.10).  These 
visual and rhetorical habits, like what was mentioned in the first chapter, 
inhibit people’s motivation to engage with impoverished communities and 
people.  They perpetuate ways of “seeing” the poor.  As an example, in 
Finnegan’s analysis of the Farm Security Administration’s (FSA) 1938 
exhibit, she notes people’s responses to the photographs documenting 
Depression era poverty.8  While the majority of responses implied that 
poverty “sometimes resulted from structural inequities in the 
socioeconomic system,” there were more hostile views as well that “drew 
upon, and indeed recycled, a familiar – if sometimes ambivalent – 
discourse of poverty” (2003 p.19).  Even as some respondents accepted 
systemic causes of poverty, there remained an “insistence upon 
maintaining distinctions between the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ 
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poor” (2003 p.19).  One viewer praised the individuals in the pictures, the 
deserving poor, while also claiming Works Progress Administration (WPA) 
workers were the underserving poor even though some of the pictures 
may have been of WPA workers.  Some viewers seemed to be responding 
to the individual in the picture: “How about practicing Birth Control?” And 
“They could do better in building homes, etc.  It’s partly their own fault” 
(Finnegan, 2003 p. 19).  Although it cannot be confirmed, it seems safe to 
conclude that viewers identified elements of the photographs that 
confirmed their preconceived ideas about people living in poverty.  They 
unconsciously approached viewing the photos. In other words, they did 
not consciously and critically consider their pre-existing biases towards 
poverty as they went through the exhibit.  Such an approach, or what 
amounts to a rhetorical stance, contributes to inhibiting discovery, 
learning, and motivation work for social action. 
 Rhetorical stance is also especially important when a person of 
power and privilege, an insider like Addams, engages with marginalized 
and oppressed groups of people. One concern is that asymmetrical power 
relations can result in misappropriation and/or misrepresentation of 
someone else’s idea or culture.  Many feminist rhetoric and writing 
scholars similarly echo this concern (Kirsch and Ritchie, 1995; Kirsch 
2003; Flower, 2008; Spivak, 2010; and others).  In her article “Beside 
Ourselves: Rhetoric and Representation in Postcolonial Feminist Writing,” 
Susan Jarratt concurs: 
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In other words, when someone uses power over others to represent 
them politically – to act for them – there is an unavoidable, 
concomitant symbolic process underway: the represented group is 
sketched, painted, described in a particular way through that 
process.  And this description may or may not “represent” them in 
ways they themselves would endorse. (1998 p.58) 
This may also be described as silencing those being “represented” 
since they are not speaking for themselves.  Their voices have been 
silenced by the power and authority inadvertently wielded by the very 
person trying to help them, which reinscribes the injustice.  According to 
Hamington, Addams expressed such a worry.  In Twenty Years at Hull 
House, Addams writes, “I never addressed a Chicago audience on the 
subject of the Settlement and its vicinity without inviting a neighbor to go 
with me, that I might curb my hasty generalization by the consciousness 
that I had an auditor who knew the conditions more intimately than I could 
hope to do” (qtd. in Hamington, 2009 p.55).  Approaching stance from a 
writing researcher’s perspective, Grabill’s position on the importance of 
stance parallels its role in engaged experience.  He argues that “stance is 
the single most important issue to consider when researching in or with 
communities” and he considers it an approach or a tool to doing research 
(2012 p.211).  “A stance,” as he defines it, “should be understood as a 
position or a set of beliefs and obligations that shape how one acts as a 
researcher” (2012 p.211).  This is true not just for a researcher, but also 
anyone who has acknowledged their social responsibility and wants to act 
upon it.  They have recognized their obligation to others, but must 
consider their beliefs, values, and sense of how to enact this responsibility 
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shape their actions in an engaged experience.  Stance, if not considered 
carefully then, can make more accurately understanding a community and 
its people more challenging, much in the way the un-interrogated visual 
and rhetorical habits of those with power and privilege can inhibit 
motivation work. 
Engaged experience calls for an open-minded rhetorical stance for 
motivation work.  Fleckenstein’s notion of compassionate living is one 
feminist approach that begins to address such challenges to motivation 
work mentioned so far.  Fleckenstein emphasizes that whatever process 
by which social action is produced, that process must be compassionate:  
Motivated and guided by this emotion [compassion], community 
members…alter situations that cause others deep distress.  Central 
to this process is the reciprocity of means and ends…the how 
affects the what.  Therefore, the tools people use to bring about 
compassionate change must also be compassionate. (2010 p.82) 
Experience could be one such tool, but these experiences must be 
appropriate for the aims of motivation work and activist inquiry as a whole.  
Experience needs to be approached in a particular way to engender 
empathy and motivation.  For instance, viewers of the FSA exhibit could 
have benefited from a conscious acknowledgement of their perceptions of 
poverty or of the available arguments surrounding poverty and the poor: 
hostile, systemic, ambivalent.  “Knowledge or awareness of the available 
arguments about a subject” is a component of Wayne Booth’s definition of 
rhetorical stance, which also includes “the interests and peculiarities of the 
audience, and the voice, the implied character of the speaker” (1963 
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p.141).  Acknowledgement of these perspectives could have altered a 
person’s stance, or to borrow from MacLean, “way of facing” the situation 
– the exhibit.  According to Hamington, “Addams’s strongest belief was 
that no one, including a wealthy woman like her, was condemned to the 
narrow perspective to which she was born, that she, or anyone, could 
understand someone from another class by listening carefully and with 
empathy to his story” (Jane Addams, 2010 p.89).  The way Addams 
“faced” the people and communities surrounding Hull House affected the 
quality and outcome of her experiences.  It helped her to better 
understand their daily lived experiences and be motivated to take some 
action to help people.  True, at first people in the area were suspicious of 
this prosperous woman’s motives for moving into a house on such a street 
and living amidst the squalor (Knight, 2005 p. 203).  However, Addams 
persisted in facing the people without judgment, inviting people she met to 
visit Hull House and in return being invited to visit (Knight, 2005 p.203).  
According to Hamington, Addams became an “involved outsider” at 
Hull House: “time, proximity, and earnest desire to learn and help won the 
trust and respect of the neighborhood” and arguably, the outsider became 
an insider (2009 p.55).  Addams was what Knight calls an “existential 
outsider,” who “do[es] their advocacy over time, in a sustained way, rather 
than sporadically, as the circumstance requires” (2016 p.8).  Engaged 
experience prefers such sustained involvement, but emphasizes a 
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rhetorical stance of compassion, non-judgement, and general open-
mindedness as critical for motivation. 
Rhetorical stance as a way of facing others, especially people from 
marginalized and oppressed communities, suggests that a key component 
to such a stance includes rhetorical practices.   These are practices that 
further the open attitude of rhetorical stance as well as demonstrate its 
enactment to others.  Krista Ratcliffe’s notion of rhetorical listening is one 
such practice.  Rhetorical listening “signifies a stance of openness that a 
person may choose to assume in relation to any person, text, or culture” 
(2005 p.1, 17).  Rhetorical listening, she argues, fosters understanding by 
“listening to discourses not for intent but with intent” (2005 p.28).  In other 
words, rhetorical listening means a person listens with the conscious 
intent to understand rather than listening merely for a way to respond.   
This clearly parallels Addams’s belief, as just mentioned: “anyone, could 
understand someone from another class by listening carefully and with 
empathy to his story” (Jane Addams, 2010 p.89).   Ratcliffe’s rhetorical 
listening is similar to Booth’s older idea of listening-rhetoric: “the whole 
range of communicative arts for reducing misunderstanding by paying full 
attention to opposing views” (2004 p.10).   However, rhetorical listening is 
more specific.  Ratcliffe conceptualizes rhetorical listening as “compris[ing] 
the following moves”: 
1. Promoting an understanding of self and other 
2. Proceeding with an accountability logic 
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3. Locating identification across commonalities and differences 
4. Analyzing claims as well as the cultural logics within which these 
claim function (2005 p.26; italics in original) 
Notably, these moves coincide with many of the goal and practices 
of activist inquiry: understanding of self in the acknowledgment of social 
responsibility for instance.  In her first article on rhetorical listening, 
Ratcliffe originally used “responsibility” instead of “accountability” (2005 
p.191). The rhetorical stance needed for engaged experience to generate 
motivation however does not claim to adhere to these moves per se, but 
they show how rhetorical listening coincides with rhetorical stance for 
activist inquiry’s overall goals. 
Addams provides a good example of the consequences of not 
adopting such an open stance as Ratcliffe’s rhetorical listening.  She 
describes a large factory strike where the business owner, George 
Pullman, had failed to listen to his workers’ concerns.  Pullman had built 
them a town with homes and stores and because of this clear act of 
benevolence; he felt that it was his right to control various aspects of their 
lives. He infringed upon their freedoms, dictating no alcohol in the 
community for example.  The workers lived with many such restrictions 
until Pullman came upon economic hardship and had to reduce their 
wages. Together the reduced wages and the restrictions moved the 
workers to strike; however, Pullman blatantly refused to hear their 
complaints or demands, deciding that they were being disloyal to him after 
all he had done for them (1902 p.46-49).  Business leadership is far from 
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being democratic and the demands of running a company diminish 
owners’ and employers’ ability to understand the difficulties their workers 
face.  “This is sure to happen,” Addams writes, “when he is good ‘to’ 
people rather than ‘with’ them, when he allows himself to decide what is 
best for them instead of consulting them” (1902 p.48).  Pullman literally did 
not listen.  For engaged experience to affect motivation for agency and 
social action, the practice of rhetorical listening contributes a key point to a 
much-needed rhetorical stance towards understanding others. 
 Admittedly here, whether someone understands something, someone, 
or some situation cannot be accurately measured.  Ratcliffe herself 
acknowledges that it is a troubled term: “Understanding has a complicated 
history in narrative studies and in philosophical studies in that it is often 
coupled with authorial intent” (2005 p.27; italics in original).  In such cases, 
what the author ideally wanted their readers to understand and whether 
they did or not is debated: the ideal versus the real.  Ratcliffe aims to 
“collapse the real/ideal dichotomy into a strategic third ground where 
rhetorical negotiation is exposed as always already existing and rhetorical 
listening is posited as one means of that negotiation” (2005 p.27).  She 
posits strategic idealism as that third ground: an idea somewhat 
compatible with the idea of understanding that can be generated from an 
open rhetorical stance and activist inquiry may be on other means for such 
negotiations.  Strategic idealism “implies a conscious identification among 
people that is based on a desire for an intersubjective receptivity, not 
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mastery, and on a simultaneous recognition of similarities and differences” 
(2005 p. 29).  As they approach engaged experience, people should 
knowingly adopt a stance of humility, respect, and generosity, consciously 
willing themselves to rhetorically listen for understanding.  They should be 
open-minded.  Ratcliffe’s primary concern is with cross-cultural exchanges 
and exploring the “intersecting identifications of gender and whiteness” 
(2005).  The open rhetorical stance needed for engaged experience does 
not deny these cross-cultural exchanges. It broadens them in the desire to 
include more than just gender and whiteness.  Rather it aims to include as 
many marginalized, oppressed, and impoverished peoples as possible, 
listening to their stories and their struggles while acknowledging that in 
practical terms understanding may be incomplete. 
The stance and practice of an open attitude suggests the need to 
consider other non-aggressive approaches.  Foss and Griffin’s invitational 
rhetoric and Hamington’s embodied care describe two such practices.  To 
review, Foss and Griffin define invitational rhetoric as “an invitation to 
understanding as a means to create a relationship rooted in equality, 
immanent value, and self-determination” (1995 p.5).  Clearly, the roots of 
such a relationship are compatible with the values of Addams’s social 
democracy.  “[Invitational rhetoric] constitutes an invitation to the audience 
to enter the rhetor’s world and see it as the rhetor does” (1995 p.5).  Like 
rhetorical listening, an invitational rhetoric relies on a stance of openness, 
appreciating and validating perspectives. However, to be clear, one of the 
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two primary rhetorical forms invitational rhetoric assumes is  “creating 
external conditions that allow and encourage others to present their 
perspectives” (Foss, 2009 p.570).  The stance for engaged experience 
does not aim to create such external conditions, only to non-prescriptively 
urge an open-minded attitude during contact with social, cultural, and 
economic difference. 
An open-rhetorical stance for engaged experience also aims to nurture 
sympathy (feeling for) and foster discovery and learning, with the final 
hope of engendering empathy (feeling with).  This is where Hamington’s 
notion of embodied care offers some more insight into the appropriate 
rhetorical stance for engaged experience.  Hamington offers this operating 
definition of care: 
Care denotes an approach to personal and social morality that 
shifts ethical considerations to context, relationships, and affective 
knowledge in a manner that can be fully understood only if care’s 
embodied dimension is recognized.  Care is committed to the 
flourishing and growth of individuals yet acknowledges our 
interconnectedness and interdependence (2004 p.3). 
Context, relationships, and knowledge-building, Hamington argues, 
must be considered in light of not only individual and social ethics but also 
embodiment in order for care to do its work.  Hamington cites Addams as 
an example of embodied care in practice.  In Addams’s argument for wide 
experience, Hamington notes, “An embodied ethic of care relies on 
experiences of the other and habits of caring to provide the corporeal 
resources for the possibility of empathy and action” (2004 p.103).  By 
corporeal resources Hamington means the knowledge gleaned from eye 
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contact, facial expressions, hand gestures, posture, and touch: “When one 
is actively attending to someone else face to face, these subtleties can be 
absorbed consciously and subconsciously through the body” (2004 p.109). 
Here, Hamington emphasizes the affective component of interactions 
between people.  Engaged experience also forwards the importance of 
place as equally affective.  Being physically present in the body involves 
rhetorically listening, looking, interpreting, and learning in a physical space 
and place.  Engaged experience, to motivate, must take from the equality 
and appreciation of invitational rhetoric, the bodily presence of 
Hamington’s notion of care, and the affective dimension that place can 
have on people. 
Addams’s notion of experience anticipates these contemporary 
feminist perspectives.  While Addams does not use the word “stance,” 
hints of an open, caring, and listening approach are implied in her call for 
“wider and more thorough human experience” (1902 p.7).  She references 
the “illuminating and dynamic value” of wide experience and mentions a 
“new curiosity regarding human life,” suggesting that the desire to learn or 
know something is important to how experience should be approached.  
An appropriate rhetorical stance for engaged experience cannot come 
from a closed mind or a sense of superiority, as Addams’s repeatedly 
criticized.  Feeling superior to others diminishes a person’s capacity to 
discover, learn, and reach understanding. They are convinced they 
already know what is happening, why it is happening, and how to change 
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the situation. From Addams’s perspective, rarely is this true.  Again, as 
already discussed, ingrained visual and rhetorical habits create upper-
class normative perceptions of the lower classes, specifically as being lazy 
and immoral.  Such habitual ways of perceiving and talking about different, 
lower socio-economic classes greatly lessen the likelihood of a person 
being open to how experience with such marginalized communities could 
inform or change their understanding.  They are “entrenched in the 
mythologies of their culture.”  Conversely, Addams describes an 
experience most likely similar to one of her own.  An open-minded, 
middle-class charity visitor ministers to a poor working-class family.  The 
visitor “lay[s] all stress upon the industrial virtues…insist[ing] that they 
must work and be self-supporting,” with the implication that in order to be 
self-sufficient they need only work more (1902 p. 10).  However, she sees 
that the family has other virtues: they are “kind and considerate of each 
other, generous to their friends, but it is her business to stick to the 
industrial side” (1902 p.7).  The visitor realizes that to judge this family 
solely on how much or how hard they work, their industry, is in 
contradiction with her own upbringing, where one’s character was just as 
or more important than being industrious.  Her openness, her listening and 
then reflecting, resulted in a new understanding. 
Finally, respect for diversity and pluralism deserve some attention 
as a couple of things that characterize the rhetorical stance Addams’s 
essentially endorsed and the one needed for engaged experience. 
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Addams’s own experiences had taught her to respect diversity.  She had 
learned, Knight notes, that “The most ‘civilized’ or ‘cultured’ 
person…understood all sorts of people — poor or middling or rich, Anglo 
or not, white or not, Christian or not, sober or no, able-bodied or not, 
healthy or sick, young or old” (2010 p.100).  “Cultured” or “civilized,” for 
Addams meant anyone who upheld the morality of a social democracy, 
valuing different others and demonstrably striving to understand them, no 
matter who they were.  This suggests not only the importance of wide 
experience but also the adoption of a willing and open stance towards 
what could be learned from such experiences.  In an extension of respect 
for diversity, Addams was also a proponent of pluralism. She conceived of 
pluralism as the necessity of including all members in the institution, 
policies, and practices of social progress (Hamington).  In arguing for the 
import of embodied care, Hamington echoes Addams: “Good citizens in a 
caring community must develop a habit of interaction, including caring 
habits, in a way that maintains an understanding and respect for diversity 
and pluralism” (2004 p.107).  Both contribute to an appropriate rhetorical 
stance for the motivation work engaged experience can do for agency and 
social action. 
Engaged experience necessitates a non-judgmental open stance 
as well as the “with” instead of “for” mentality.  Doing something “for” a 
marginalized person or group suggests a sense of superiority and risks 
the likelihood of misrepresentation as discussed earlier.  It implies 
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knowing what must be done, but not consulting or dialoguing with those 
personally and directly involved in the oppressive situation.  To put this in 
Freirean terms, “Any attempt to ‘soften’ the power of the oppressor in 
deference to the weakness of the oppressed almost always manifests 
itself in the form of false generosity” (2009 p.44).  In doing “for” 
marginalized groups (the oppressed), the oppressors (Addams’s upper-
class readers) attempt a show of respect for their unjust situations; 
however, these attempts betray a generosity that serves the oppressor’s 
position of power and does not assuage an injustice.  In this way, a 
rhetorical stance of “for” closes or narrows the possibility for discovery and 
learning. “With” suggests a stance of cooperation, association, dialogue — 
in other words, engaged experience.  In summary, an open rhetorical 
stance for engaged experience requires a commitment to being open-
minded, inviting a person to consciously engage by noting their pre-
conceptions, visual and rhetorical habits, and using compassion, rhetorical 
listening, and embodied care as tools to a fuller understanding of the daily 
lived experiences of the marginalized and oppressed.  This understanding, 
in turn, can motivate them to not only engage in further experiences but 




Motivation: Engaged Experience and Disruption 
The following describes both how a text encourages engaged 
experience (through another’s descriptions of their experiences) and how 
engaged experience can motivate someone to act in ways that assuage 
social injustices.  Activist inquiry and its motivation work rely on engaged 
experiences in and with marginalized, impoverished communities for the 
possibility of empathy and subsequent action.  “Choosing our 
experiences,” as Addams says, is our ethical duty (1902 p.5).  Discovery, 
learning, and empathy (feeling with), as discussed, result from concertedly 
assuming an open rhetorical stance during those engaged experiences 
but there is an additional contributor to motivation work at play here – 
emotionally disruptive discrepancies and contradictions.  These can 
surface from engaged experience and subsequent reflection.  Margaret 
Urban Walker, a feminist philosopher, claims “moral competence draws on 
propositional knowledge - ‘know that’ — but also on perceptive, imagined, 
and expressive capacities supported by habits of emotional response” 
(qtd. in Hamington, “Jane Addams’ Disruptive Emotional Epistemology” 
2002).  Walker suggests that emotional knowledge “ignites empathy, 
draws our attention, and tugs at our heartstrings to act” (qtd. in 
Hamington, “Jane Addams’ Disruptive Emotional Epistemology” 2002). 
Engaged experiences, thus described, have the potential to reveal 
inconsistencies between previously held ideas and the realities faced by 
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marginalized and oppressed groups.  Although activist inquiry emphasizes 
empathy over sympathy in the process of motivation work, Addams’s 
notion of sympathetic knowledge, like Walker, stresses the importance of 
disruption for knowledge building.  “Fundamentally,” Hamington explains:  
Sympathetic knowledge is the idea that humans can learn about 
one another in terms that move beyond propositional knowledge, 
that is rather than merely learning facts, knowledge is gained 
through openness to disruptive knowledge. Knowledge can be 
disruptive in the sense that new information potentially transforms 
one’s perceived experience and understanding.  (2014) 
Perceiving contradictions, especially big ones, can be emotionally 
disruptive and build knowledge of situations and people.  This is similar to 
Fleckenstein’s use of antinomy in her knot of contradictions, which can 
lead to subversive social action.  She conceives of antinomy “As a way of 
seeing that privileges change,” which suits activist inquiry’s social action 
aims (2010 p115).  Fleckenstein conceptualizes one aspect of antinomy 
as disruptiveness, likening it to Burke’s process of “‘perspective by 
incongruity’ that produces new classifications”  (2010 p.115)9.  This 
disruptiveness arises, at least in part, from paradoxes and contradictions 
that make meaning uncomfortably ambiguous.  Individuals strive to 
resolve the disruptive ambiguity and in the process produce new 
meanings (2010 p.116).  For instance, contradictory visual and discursive 
representations of religious figures such as Jesus make some people very 
uncomfortable.  Depictions of Jesus as a Caucasian male with blonde hair 
have been culturally and discursively sustained in Western culture; 
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therefore for some seeing a black Jesus is contradictory to their idea of 
what he looked like (Figure 3.1).  In addition, hearing others “validate the  
 
Figure 3.1 Caucasian Jesus (left); Black Jesus (right) 
 
correctness of [this] representation over [the other] move[s] the perceiver 
into a visual predicament, the resolution of which can potentially open up a 
new understanding about race, self, other, and cultural fantasies” 
(Fleckenstein, 2010 p.119).  The contradiction between a white Jesus and 
a historically more accurate version of him as darker-skinned can 
emotionally disrupt some people enough to encourage a reflection upon 
their feelings about racial tensions and their perceptions of race and ethics 
in general. 
Such contradictions must be sufficiently disruptive on an emotional 
level for such new motivating understandings to even begin to emerge 
during or after engaged experience.  In one of her conference 
presentations on Addams, Hamington argues that Addams uses 
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something she calls an “emotionally disruptive epistemology” (2014).  This 
epistemology “exemplifies aspects of modern feminist notions of moral 
epistemology and social epistemology” while also forwarding a theory that 
“disruptive knowledge [is] necessary for moral action” (2014).  Indeed, 
Addams contends, “The mass of men seldom move together without an 
emotional incentive” (1902 p.80).  Hamington provides a good example 
that could equally apply to the engaged experience aspect of activist 
inquiry: 
What makes emotional epistemology disruptive knowledge is that it 
transforms abstract understanding into a concrete understanding. 
This concretization takes on a particular form, which can be 
characterized as human or at least embodied. The embodied 
connection allows for a felt understanding with a greater potential to 
shake us from the rhythms of our ongoing lives to take moral 
action. For example, I could tell you that UNICEF reports that one-
third of all children under the age of five in developing countries are 
malnourished. You may feel this is tragic but few of you would be 
moved emotionally. However, if I brought in a child who grew up 
amid such conditions and she described the experience and you 
saw the expressions on her face, the inflection of her voice, her 
hand gestures and body movements, you would be more likely to 
have a felt response than you would from any statistical 
presentation. The potential for disruption is greater because 
malnourishment was concretized for you in a way that made  an 
embodied connection. (2002) 
There is a foreshadowing here of the embodied care Hamington 
later contends Addams demonstrates.  Hamington emphasizes concrete, 
embodied experience approached with “care.”  Like Min-Zhan Lu argues 
in his article “Reading and Writing Differences: The Problematic of 
Experience,” “We need to imagine ways of using experience critically: 
experience should motivate us to care about another’s differences and 
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should disrupt the material conditions that have given rise to it (2003 
p.436).  Emotionally disruptive moments of contradiction and paradox 
during engaged experience can spur on motivation for agency and social 
action. 
Since engaged experience must happen in marginalized and 
oppressed communities, the role of place (scene) in engaged experience 
should not be forgotten.  In Geographies of Writing, Nedra Reynolds 
explores geography as a “lived event — including how spaces and places 
are inscribed upon us — and how our experiences in spaces of the 
everyday impact upon our identities, our confidence, our senses of self” 
(2007 p.10).  Reynolds explains further: 
…conceptions of space tend to ignore the ways in which people 
move through the world, or the spatial practices that shape 
lifeworlds.  It is not only places and their built-in constraints that 
determine certain practices, but also the adjustments and 
compromises, the shifts and turns in the process of accommodating 
to a place. (14) 
Addams moved in and through the tenement neighborhoods 
surrounding Hull House.  Assuredly, place impacted her understanding of 
the people and their struggles.  Initially she would have moved through 
them as an outsider, most likely a little intimidated.  She reports: “[W]hen 
you go and live in [such] a neighborhood, you feel a little swallowed up” 
(qtd. in Knight, 2005 p. 203).  Engaged experience, as it has been 
described thus far, would likely put a person in situations they find not just 
emotionally uncomfortable and disruptive but potentially physically as well.  
Addams also reported, saying in her customary third person narration: 
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“The first settlers [at Hull House] felt as if they were going into a strange 
country, [where they would]…encounter people more or less unlike 
themselves” (qtd. in Knight, 2005 p.203).  Place then, as Reynolds says, 
can “…position the learner as an outsider, a foreigner, an other – a 
positioning that, in its discomfort, often stimulates reflection” (2004 p.113).   
Thinking about place as a lived experience that shapes people highlights 
how engaged experience in impoverished communities can be emotionally 
disruptive. 
For the motivation work of activist inquiry, Democracy and Social 
Ethics provides a few good examples of knowledge-building via 
emotionally disruptive engaged experience.  They are disruptive in large 
part because they reveal contradictions, inconsistencies, and 
discrepancies between what was believed about a situation and the social, 
economic, and material reality of it.  In an attempt to avoid confusion if 
possible, remember that Addams describes her experiences to show her 
readers how they can change their understanding of the situations and 
people involved.  However, she wants her readers to have embodied, 
engaged experiences themselves because that is how, she argues, they 
will make their own discoveries and understandings.  To move on to an 
example of an emotionally disruptive experience, in the second chapter, 
“On Charitable Efforts,” Addams describes the experiences of a charity 
worker.  Although she does not in this case identify the worker with 
herself, it can readily be assumed this was her experience.  In a situation 
97 
 
not uncommon even today, a family applies for assistance because one or 
more of the earners in the household have lost their jobs, whether due to 
an illness, being laid off, or “for other guiltless and inevitable reasons” 
(1902 p.10).  The charity visitor, who Addams describes as a “young 
college woman, well-bred and open-minded,” goes to the family and 
preaches the value of work and self-sufficiency.  The worker comes from a 
middle-class position of relative financial security and material abundance, 
belonging to the class of people who do not work with their hands as 
compared to those who do, a socio-culturally derided division of labor that 
persists to this day.  The emotional disruption occurs as a result of the 
inconsistency between her values and those of the lower class:  
“Doubtless,” Addams observes, “the clashes and jars which we all feel 
most keenly are those which occur when two standards of morals both 
honestly held and believed in, are brought sharply together” (1902 p.33).  
Her middle-class values stress working more hours so that the family can 
be self-sufficient, as her own family.  It has also been impressed upon her 
that the poor are lazy and ignorant, and fail to save money like they 
should.  Therefore, part of her job, she feels, is to motivate them and/or 
help them understand how they should behave and what they should do.  
That is their “need” and the one to which she must minister.  As she visits 
lower working class families stricken by poverty and often ill-health, she is, 
as Addams says, “perplexed by recognitions and suggestions which the 
situation forces upon her” (1902 p.10).  Her middle-class upbringing has 
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impressed upon her an image of the lower class that clashes with the 
discoveries engaged experience has revealed.  She learns that they are 
not in fact lazy.  Instead, many circumstances that are largely out of their 
control, such as employers paying very little for long hours of work, have 
led to the situation.  Further, she observes the practice of an ethic of 
neighborly care: “The visitor says, sometimes, that in holding her poor 
family so hard to a standard of thrift [saving], which seems quite 
commendable in a comfortable part of town, appears almost criminal in a 
poorer quarter where the next-door neighbor needs food” (1902 p.13).  
Emotionally, she is disturbed and perplexed then as to the right course of 
action; however, this can motivate her, as it did Addams to find alternate 
approaches to assuaging poverty and injustice.  These contradictions of 
understanding, between what was assumed and what has been observed 
and learned through engaged experience, coax reflection and knowledge-
building for motivation. 
In another example of engaged experience for motivation, the 
charity worker “finds herself still more perplexed” as Addams puts it, by 
parents’ “lust of dominion” over their children and their “despotism” (1902 
p.15).  The worker urges parents to base relationships with their children 
on “love and confidence.”  The women she preaches this to are puzzled 
though: “If you did not keep control over them from the time they were 
little, you would never get their wages when they are grown up” (Addams, 
1902 p.17).  Parents expected and needed their child to provide for them 
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financially when they could no longer work.  It was a matter of survival, but 
the worker “does not in the least,” Addams writes, “understand the 
industrial foundation for this family tyranny” because her “family relation is 
lifted quite out of this” (1902 p.17).  The charity worker can, as one woman 
told her, “afford to be lax with [her children, because even if they don’t give 
money to her, she can get along without it” (Addams, 1902 p.17).   
Addams describes these burgeoning understandings as “most harrowing” 
to the charity worker (1902 p.18).  They are emotionally disturbing and 
because of engaging with these working-class families, the charity worker 
saw the incongruity between middle-class ideals and lower-class realities.  
She arrived at a new understanding of the situation and its injustice, which 
can be motivation for some. 
On a broader, more community-based level, the worker also 
learned how an unemployed man could still have “undoubted social value” 
(Addams, 1902 p. 18).  The worker came across a man who had been 
blacklisted from working due to a strike.  Through “inquiry and a little 
experience,” she learned that he was a poor worker (Addams, 1902 p.18). 
She would have called him “lazy and good-for-nothing, and denounce him 
as worthless as her grandmother might have done” (Addams, 1902 p18). 
However, she discovered that he benefited the community in other ways: 
“other workmen c[a]me to him for shrewd advice” and he was “a constant 
speaker at workingmen’s meetings” and clearly “contributed a certain 
intellectuality to his friends”  (Addams, 1902 p.18).   Addams describes the 
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worker as being deeply perplexed about how to proceed with the family 
and the community that criticizes the unemployed man because now his 
wife must support the family (1902 p.18).  The hard working wife, 
however, “does not show for an instant that she thinks he has grown lazy” 
(1902 p. 18).  The worker compares the situation to her own wealthier 
friends’ working lives. They chose to work so that their husbands could 
find better positions and they just had to live on less income rather than no 
income.  Thus, the worker comes across another contradiction.  Having 
praised her friends’ actions as noble, she feels wrong in condemning the 
working wife’s decision to support her husband (1902 p.18).  This 
emotionally disruptive situation gave the worker a new understanding of 
how socio-economic class affects perceptions of people and the 
communities in which they live, and although she may not know what to 
do, she is motivated to learn more and eventually take social action. 
An example of the motivation work of engaged experience in the 
21st century is a little difficult to imagine and begins to step into the 
territory of the next chapter.  Addams literally lived among the tenements 
of Chicago’s Halsted Street.  She “intended Hull House to be a place 
where the privileged and educated could live and work among the poor in 
the community dedicated to the betterment of the neighborhood” 
(Hamington, 2004 p.97).  Hamington calls it an “epistemological portal into 
urban life” (2004 p.97).  Hypothetically, such a place now could serve a 
similar purpose, providing a location to foster engaged experiences.  
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Would people come?  Would they be able to commit to living in the 
community for an extended period of time? 
 
Conclusion 
Engaged experience motivates because it reveals incongruities that 
can be emotionally disruptive enough to spark and internalize empathic 
feelings: “the love and patience which ministers to need irrespective of 
worth” (Addams 1902 p.22).  While this will not always necessarily be the 
case, highlighting internalized unconscious contradictions between pre-
conceptions, beliefs, and values and the reality of an unjust situation can 
be a powerful way of unsettling ingrained habitual rhetorics of poverty.  
Addams’s sensitive, sympathetic descriptions point out many 
contradictions, particularly that of valuing democracy but not living 
democratically.  In other words, they point out hypocrisy, valuing equality 
and diversity for example, but not acting upon that value by say not 
working towards granting others equal rights and opportunities.  Engaged 
experience heightens a sense of social responsibility and it emphasizes 
the interpretation or analysis of a situation that gives way to motivation as 
part of inventing agency.  Activist inquiry asks privileged insiders to 
dominant ideologies and power to engage openly with marginalized and 
oppressed groups and to practice embodied care and rhetorical listening 
in the process – a non-judgmental, open-minded rhetorical stance.  
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Engaged experiences can lead to motivation as emotionally disruptive 
contradictions arise. 
For example, stories of undeserving recipients of food assistance 
programs abound on the internet10.  The claims are consistent with the 
hostile view of poverty: these are people who are lazy, don’t want to work, 
are on drugs and therefore do not deserve to be helped by taxpayer 
dollars.  Now, imagine taking a person who held such ideas, someone 
who may not be wealthy but is privileged enough to have adequate food.  
First, explain rhetorical listening and embodied care practices and then 
ask them to follow a food assistance recipient through one day of their 
lives: to the grocery, to their home and neighborhood.  What might they 
learn in just one day? What if they were engaged with the food stamp 
recipient for weeks or months? What are their experiences likely to help 
them discover?  It is just speculation, and it would not necessarily apply to 
every situation, but new understandings of at least this one person’s 
reality can be imagined.  The recipient actually works long hours in two 
part-time jobs; food assistance is not sufficient for the family’s nutritional 
needs; or lack of adequate heating makes it difficult to sleep and then 
difficult to work the next day.  Preconceived notions about marginalized 
people and their communities meet the realities of these people’s daily 
lived experiences.  However, this example falls short because it is surface 
level knowledge rather than building deeper understandings of the 
systemic factors contributing to poverty.  It also reinforces the “deserving” 
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versus “undeserving” poor, which does not further the social democracy 
Addams advocates.  Still, it may yet motivate a person to engage more 
and gradually, perhaps the invention of agency for social action.  The 
power of engaged experience to motivate rests in negotiating meaning 
and building knowledge by reflecting upon emotionally disruptive 
contradictions.  While this can result in new conceptual understandings, 
engaged experience also plays a role in knowledge building for the 
purpose of taking social action – praxis, where theory and practice come 
together.  That is the focus of the next chapter, taking the motivation that 
can emerge from engaged experience to the next step of imagining 







We forget that the accumulation of knowledge and the holding of 
convictions must finally result in the application of that knowledge and 
those convictions to life itself. 
— Jane Addams (1902) 
 
We cannot move to action without deciding what needs to be changed and 
what can be changed.  
— Kristie Fleckenstein (2010) 
 
In the last chapter, I discussed the challenge of motivation — how 
can someone be motivated to take social action?  Activist inquiry 
highlights an answer focused primarily on rhetorical stance and the 
practices of engaged experience with marginalized people in their 
communities.  Moving on to the final challenge, this chapter deals with a 
more general question.  What actions are possible and are there places 
available within which to take those actions?  Put another way, how does 
someone know what to do or what can be done to ameliorate the situation 
and not exacerbate the injustice? This is a question of taking ethical social 
action.  As Fleckenstein asks, “if agency is possible, are venues available 
within which to alter rather than reinforce the unjust situation?” (2010 
p.17).  Fleckenstein’s reference to “if agency is possible” refers more 
specifically to the disempowered and oppressed who may not have a 
“safe forum from which to protest [their] mistreatment” (2010 p.17).  In no 
way does activist inquiry mean to ignore the importance of empowering 
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marginalized groups to social action, however, this dissertation has 
focused more on carefully considering the privileged insider as a 
potentiality for agency and social action with the marginalized and 
oppressed. 
If it were to work ideally, activist inquiry would prompt privileged 
insiders to be what Knight calls voluntary existential outsider-insiders.  
According to Knight, Addams was a voluntary existential outsider-insider: 
she was among those “born as social insiders by virtue of their class, race, 
gender and/or other advantage. Nonetheless, they decide, for moral 
reasons, to align themselves fully with the less powerful, the oppressed, 
the disadvantaged, the struggling” (Knight, 2016 p.10).  Addams’s insider 
privilege afforded her a college education and the ability to travel, which 
meant she learned about different people and cultures.  Through her 
experiences, her perceptions of the poor and disempowered evolved and 
she came to a better understanding of the complexities surrounding the 
injustices they suffered.  She saw the material conditions of their lives, the 
quality, and the inequality.  Addams’s new understanding moved her to 
urge others to do as she had and become insider-outsiders — to 
recognize their social responsibility, to engage with marginalized 
communities and people, and through it imagine avenues for social action. 
Returning then to the question: how does someone know what to 
do or what can be done to ameliorate an unjust situation and not 
exacerbate the injustice?  There can be no answer that is true and 
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efficacious for all people in all situations.  Going with the idea of avenues, 
there are no bright fluorescent arrows painted on the road that inexorably 
lead to “effective social action” where the intended results are always 
beneficial and never harmful.  Anyone can have good intentions with their 
actions, even believe the outcome was beneficial, but if their actions are 
ill-informed the results are not as likely to be effective.  Ill-informed actions 
echo the problem of speaking for instead of with those whom an activist is 
trying to aid.  The intended outcome and the means of achieving it 
(agency and action) needs to come from a place of knowledge, 
understanding, and empathy.  In this sense, activist inquiry as a whole 
represents one action, an (a)venue, that could be sufficiently effective but 
it would be naïve to assume that it would work in all circumstances. 
In this chapter, I take a look at the idea of (a)venues for social 
action that may be taken, but in the spirit of rhetorical listening, abstain 
from making judgments of certainty about their efficaciousness.  The 
effectiveness of a particular action cannot be determined until an intention 
is announced and the action to achieve it has been formulated.  Then the 
intended action is taken and the effects are observed for their efficacy.  
So, for example, various organizations, independent workers and 
volunteers set up food pantries with the intent of reducing hunger among 
the poor.  The action of setting up the food pantry has been taken and its 
intent is clear, but whether or not it is successful must be determined by 
collecting data over time.  If it is not succeeding, then new theories as to 
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why it is not and what action should be taken next have to formulated.    
This is a pragmatist way of approaching a problem: reflection, theory, 
action.  Remember, Addams was a pragmatist.  She believed “mistakes 
[are] merely a part of the pragmatist cycle of action and reflection,” along 
the lines of Freirian praxis (Hamington, 2016).  Freire argued “human 
activity consists of action and reflection: it is praxis; it is transformation of 
the world.  And praxis requires theory to illuminate it” (1970 p.125).  
Theories require revision based on the outcome of enacting them or 
putting them into practice.  Those theories pertaining to social action 
especially require such rethinking because of at least two critical points.  
For one, as has already been established, the goal of social action is to 
redress inequities and not reinforce them.  Therefore, reflecting upon 
actions in light of the possibility that they may have reinforced the problem 
can help with revising the approach.  Second, “Social change,” 
Fleckenstein points out, “does not occur in a neat linear progression that 
moves logically from desire to language to beneficially changed 
reality…Nor does social action proceed in a similar linear progression from 
individual to group to seismic social change…social action results from a 
circular causality” (2010 p.6).  Social action and social change occur as 





Figure 4.1 Visual representation of praxis 
 
This chapter focuses on the “action” in social action, and for my 
purposes, I refer to what actions may be taken as (a)venues.  Addams 
method for persuading her own readers to become closely involved with 
marginalized people suggests, but again does not prescribe, what action 
might be taken to assuage suffering and injustice.   Therefore, to stay true 
to activist inquiry’s similar goal, I am sometimes purposefully vague. 
(A)venues need to be thought of as possibilities and how those may be 
invented rather than certainties or commandments to do a particular thing.   
(A)venues take advantage of another feminist tool: Royster and Kirsch’s 
idea of critical imagination, which I will elaborate on in the next section.  I 
also examine how critical materialism might be useful for imagining 
(a)venues.  Imagining (a)venues for social action overlaps somewhat with 
the last chapter in that those possible (a)venues arise from the discoveries 
and knowledge building of engaged experience, particularly if a person 
has committed to it over a long period of time.  Engaged experience of this 
109 
 
kind has the best chance of imagining effective (a)venues for social action: 
ameliorating and not reinforcing unjust situations. 
 
Why (A)venues? 
By putting the “a” in parentheses, (a)venues aims to highlight the 
idea that action is comprised of two parts.  One part consists of thoughts, 
concepts, imagination, and reflection – avenues.  The other is material 
and physical – venues.  First, while an “avenue” can be a physical path, it 
also denotes a way of approaching a problem, like having an idea about 
what to do.  Depending on the nature of the problem, this approach may 
be easily identified or it may take some time.  If there is a water leak under 
the sink, the first approach you might take is to tighten the connectors or 
maybe just call a plumber.  Either would be a sensible and straightforward 
approach, but if you cannot afford a plumber, then how you solve this 
problem may take some imagination: wrap a rag around it, put a bucket 
underneath the drip, or do an online search on how to repair a leaky pipe.  
Here, a problem is identified, an idea or avenue considered, and an action 
implemented. 
As part of the formulation of an (a)venue, reflection plays a key 
role.  As I have described it so far, reflection is a stage prior to action and 
this is somewhat in contradiction to Freire’s contention that “praxis implies 
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no dichotomy by which this praxis could be divided into a prior state of 
reflection and a subsequent stage of action” (1970 p.128).  Freire argues: 
Action and reflection occur simultaneously.  A critical analysis of 
reality may, however, reveal that a particular form of action is 
impossible or inappropriate at the present time. Those who through 
reflection perceive the infeasibility or inappropriateness of one or 
another form of action (which should accordingly be postponed or 
substituted) cannot thereby be accused of inaction.  Critical 
reflection is also action. (1970 p. 128) 
Admitting that action and reflection can occur simultaneously, it 
remains unclear why they cannot happen separately.  Reflection can be 
considered apart from action, being undertaken before, during as Freire 
insists, and after.  Identifying (a)venues for social action requires a similar 
route.  One of Flower’s examples illustrates this well.  Jon and his class 
had organized a Think Tank aimed at “foreground[ing] the plight and the 
often-overlooked, situated knowledge of the nursing aides [at a local 
African American nursing home]” (2008 p.119).  Because of his academic 
expertise, Jon expected that he would be an “advice” giver; however, after 
talking with the nurses, who had “ten times his experience in adversity,” he 
found that he had no advice to give (2008 p.119).   Jon reflected on his 
role prior to engaging with the nurses and during their conversations he 
continued to consider his changing attitude about who he was and what 
he could do.  In a later written reflection, Jon says he found “that the mere 
act of taking interest in someone’s life can help you break through barriers 
that block communication, even those created by difference of race and 
culture” (2008 p.119).  From his initial reflection to his final, he now knows 
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of an action to test: merely taking interest in people’s lives, asking them 
questions, and engaging with them has the potential to bridge boundaries 
between people.  Jon had reflected upon his role prior to engaging with 
the nursing home community, acted upon what he thought would work, 
and discovered it did not.  So he then reflected again upon how he should 
change the way in which he engages with the people at the home.  He 
learned through engaged experience the import of rhetorical listening and 
the impact it can have marginalized people. 
Taking Jon’s experience into consideration, inquiry – asking 
questions, dialoguing, and being open learn – creates ways for imagining 
(a)venues.  For instance, at a local community meeting, Sam brings up the 
problem of food insecurity and pervasive hunger in an area of the town 
next to his neighborhood.  How might he and/or the community assuage 
this problem?  One resident recommends setting up an additional food 
pantry and another suggests a survey to ascertain the pervasiveness of 
the problem.  Yet another person forwards the idea of a door-to-door food 
delivery service.  All of these are ways of reflecting upon the issue prior to 
action, but so too are those possibilities or opportunities not yet imagined. 
Other questions have not been posed, such as, why is food insecurity on 
the rise?  How is “food insecurity” being defined in our community?  How 
do race, gender, and ethnicity factor in with poverty and hunger?  And 
most importantly for (a)venues to social action, has anyone engaged with 
those affected by food insecurity?  Questioning those affected from the 
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stance of engaged experience results in a better understanding of the 
situation and what (a)venues might work to ameliorate the problem. 
In the context of activist inquiry, avenues, without the “a” in 
parentheses, are conceptual.  In other words, “avenues” emphasizes the 
role of imagination in devising questions and seeing different ways to 
approach an issue, always with the goal of assuaging an injustice.  
Royster defines imagination as “a commitment to making connections and 
seeing possibilities” (2000 p.83).  This is similar to Shor’s definition of 
critical literacy: “question[ing] the way things are and imagin[ing] 
alternatives” (1999 pp. 24).  In Traces of a Stream, Royster describes 
critical imagination in more detail: 
…imagination functions as a critical skill in questioning a viewpoint, 
an experience, an event, and so on, and in remaking interpretive 
frameworks based on that questioning…The use of critical 
imagination does not at all negate the need to do the hard work of 
engaging systematically in theoretically grounded processes of 
discovery, analysis, and interpretation. (2000 p.83-84) 
Devising alternate questions is one example of such a commitment 
to critical imagination because different questions make other connections 
to the problem more visible.  Building upon Royster’s definition of critical 
imagination, Royster and Kirsch together consider critical imagination to 
be an inquiry tool for “seeing the noticed and the unnoticed, thinking what 
is there and not there, and speculating about what could be there instead” 
(2012 p.20).  “It is a mechanism,” they argue, “for enabling and energizing 
within scholarly processes a space for rigorous contemplation” (2010 
p.21).  Activist inquiry is not necessarily intended to be an endeavor for 
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scholars alone, but thinking of imagination in terms of a method of inquiry, 
a tool, builds upon how someone might begin to see and devise avenues.  
Critical imagination as a process of rigorous contemplation and not merely 
an endpoint contributes the more rigorous aspects of systematic analysis 
and interpretation to the ability to conceptualize an avenue for social 
action. 
Seeing what is often left unseen or unnoticed and thinking about 
what is and is not there hints at critical materialism, which adds a degree 
of physicality to the idea of critical imagination for avenues.  Drawing on 
McNally, Scott and Welch argue that critical materialism strives to “think 
about language through the body” in order to “rematerialize networks of 
labor disappeared by global commodity flows” (2014 p.573).  In the 
technologized, globalized world of the 21st century, the physical, laboring 
body tends to get forgotten as media outlets and others focus on the 
material of digital production.  The message takes center stage: “the idea 
of the public conversation becomes the conversation” in a prime example 
of “how technological innovation ‘introduces into human affairs’ a 
McLuhanesque enthrallment with the ‘change of scale or pace or pattern’” 
(2014 p. 564-565).  Notably, during the early 1900s, Addams witnessed a 
similar enthrallment with the speed in which products could be 
manufactured in the factories of the industrial revolution.  Like today, the 
physical, laboring body tended to be forgotten as consumers cared more 
about access to goods than who was making them and in what conditions. 
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Understanding “what is really going on” so to speak, is important for 
avenues because misunderstanding or ignorance/unawareness can result 
in ineffective social action. 
In continuing to consider what may not be seen and how that can 
impact whether an avenue for social action is effective, Scott and Welch 
worry that “Journalists, scholars, and policy advocates,” prioritize “the new 
technological form of [a] video’s launch, the speed and mass reach of its 
reception” (2014 p. 564).  In the example Scott and Welch give, these 
journalists and others focus on the idea that  “global discussion” is being 
made a reality.  They choose an alternative metaphor for this “global 
conversation:” 
One train can hide another.  Just as one train can hide another, 
when our conceptions of public rhetorical practice prioritize 
discursive features and digitized form over – and to the exclusion of 
– historical context and human consequences, we miss how texts 
may mobilize meaning not to upend but to reinforce relations of 
power. (2014 p.565) 
In the Kony 2012 example Scott and Welch give, the conversation 
about how this human rights’ video went viral dominated the global 
conversation, and hid another meaning.  Hidden behind its purpose to 
“galvanize the public into action,” which it failed at, “was how it 
“marshal[ed] public acceptance of a military campaign already underway” 
(2014 p.565).  By securing people’s allegiance to a U.S. Congressional 
policy already being pursued, Kony 2012 ultimately reinforced the power 
of Congress and its Senators to control public opinion for something it was 
doing.  This more controlling motive was revealed through a critical 
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examination of the content of the video, how it was received, and the 
history behind human rights’ efforts in Uganda (the focus of the film).  
Imagining (a)venues for social action must keep in mind such close 
examinations and consider critical materialism as a useful tool.  The risk of 
ignoring the materiality of any situation, as an upcoming example from 
Addams details, is that something important may be hiding behind the 
train.  Whatever it is may be reinforcing the problem. 
Scott and Welch also give an example of critical materialism from a 
pedagogical perspective that shows its usefulness for imagining 
(a)venues.  In an introductory geography class, the instructor asks 
students to make a list of everything they had for breakfast and where it 
came from – its origins.  They attempt as complete an inventory as 
possible of everything “needed to create, transport, and prepare ‘the 
bread, the sugar, the coffee, the milk; the cups, knives, and forks, toasters 
and plastic plates – to say nothing of the machinery and equipment 
needed to produce all these things’” (Scott and Welch, 2014 p.573).  
Students begin to see what links them to the millions of people in the 
world laboring to provide these things for their consumption, but Scott and 
Welch warn, the lesson is not about consumption.  This exercise, 
according to Scott and Welch, promotes students’ “understanding of 
human geography and political economy along with mutual recognition 
among people otherwise unaware of their ties to one another” (2014 p. 
573).   Asking people to see such links can make the material realities of 
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others, their labor and the injustices often surrounding it, more apparent.  
This pedagogical exercise represents an (a)venue.  The instructor is 
taking an action, the lesson he imagined, as a step towards alleviating 
unjust situations.  Of course, this is a very small step, but an (a)venue 
nonetheless.  Recognizing the realities revealed by critically examining the 
material conditions of labor can inform imagining (a)venues.  It is 
important for social action.  As Artz claims, for social action the first thing a 
person needs to do is “recognize the material conditions of our lives, 
especially the social relations of capitalism and its class contradictions 
expressed in …consumerism, individualism…and the quality and 
inequality of life” (2011 p.54).  Such recognition increases the 
understanding needed to imagine (a)venues for effective social action. 
Critical materialism is a good segue between the abstractness of 
imagined avenues to the material, physical, and literal venues. In a simple 
sense, venues are where organized events happen: a convention center 
or other geographical location that can be identified on a map.  For social 
action, venues can be places where activism takes place, be it a soup 
kitchen feeding the hungry or the streets surrounding a capital building for 
a protest.  Of course, these venues are necessary for social action and in 
some cases, a venue for action cannot be imagined, as was the case for 
Fleckenstein’s example:  “Magaly has no safe forum from which to protest 
her mistreatment and to counter the story of her death disseminated 
through government-supported newspapers.” Magaly had been mistakenly 
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arrested and reported as dead by the government and “she has no place 
from which she can speak, only places where she must be silent” (2010 
p.17).  In order to survive, Magaly must remain in the shadows, “living 
invisible to the government eye” (Fleckenstein, 2010 p.17).  Activist inquiry 
seeks to counter this with the insider-outsider whose position of power can 
be used to identify venues from which to work on behalf and with the 
silenced. Venues emphasize the embodied experience as people move in 
and through places, intentionally seeing and/or aimlessly scanning.  As 
will be discussed in the next section, Addams’s embodied experience of 
the neighborhoods surrounding Hull House demonstrate intentionally 
noticing the unnoticed and what (a)venues those observations suggest. 
Addams experienced Halsted street, but to be even more specific, 
she moved through the space and place of these communities, which 
presented to her possibilities for both avenues and venues – imagining 
what might be done and a location for action.  First, to clarify the ideas of 
space and place, in Geographies of Writing, Nedra Reynolds offers up this 
description: 
Space is probably the less understood or the more-taken-for-
granted.  As logic or common sense would indicate, space is 
“bigger” than place, but the two are intricately related.  Places 
emerge from space with the passage of time…Space is the more 
conceptual notion…while place is defined by people and events.  In 
one sense, places are fixed position on a map, or you can follow 
directions to get there.  Space, if you will, structures our habitats 
but cannot be inhabited.  Places touch people’s lives and evoke 
memories and emotions. (2004 p.181) 
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A place could be a store or a town square, but the latter is often referred to 
as a public space.  A town square may simply be referred to as a  “space” 
because it is an area undefined by walls, where diverse groups of people 
sometimes meet for events or merely pass through in daily life.  Reynolds 
argues that place is “a lived event” in the sense that there are “ways 
people move through the world” and places have “built-in constraints that 
determine certain practices, which then become habitual or taken for 
granted” (2004 p. 14).  Furthermore, ways of moving through the world 
also encompasses, “the adjustments and compromises, the shifts and 
turns in the process of accommodating to a place” (2004 p.14).  Reynolds 
gives a good example: 
A composition instructor assigned to a tiered lecture hall with 
bolted-down seats is upset by the room assignment; she must 
make contortionist changes to the collaborative groups practices of 
the class.  However, at some point in the semester, the 
configurations become so routine that the room assignment is no 
longer an issue – everyone adapts.  Once constraints become 
familiar…they become encoded and thus rarely noticed or 
questioned.  The daily routine elides the process of adapting…and 
the idea that space doesn’t matter [takes over].  (2004 p.14). 
The whole class had to adjust to the restrictions imposed by the space but 
it quickly became habitual.  The poster on the sidewalk is an apt example: 
“A poster down here makes you stop.  A homeless youth down here 
makes you walk faster” (Figure 4.2).  When people ignore the homeless, 
they are exhibiting not so much a forced but a culturally learned 
adjustment to the space that determines the practice of “look forward and 
keep walking.”  The poster also represents a good example of an 
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imagined (a)venue for social action, although it is uncertain whether it 
assuaged the issue.       
 
  
Figure 4.2 Homeless youth advocacy poster 
 
Additionally, Reynolds asserts that space cannot be inhabited; 
however, I argue that space can indeed be inhabited in the literal sense 
and that habitus, a concept she draws upon, plays a role in whether a 
place or space becomes an (a)venue for social action.  “Habitus,” 
Reynolds says, “attempts to represent how social behaviors, habits, 
become so naturalized as to be inscribed onto the body” (2004 p.58).  
People develop habitual behaviors when moving through a space or place 
and these can leave visible indications on the body.  Reynolds references 
such examples as “a ballet student whose legs and posture already show 
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the signs of dance training, or someone abused as a child who often 
cowers at a raised hand or sudden movement” (2004 p.58).  The habitual 
way someone moves through a space or place can indicate that a person 
is not open to interacting with their surroundings – the environment and 
the other people in it.  Places are constructed, “Drawing upon hearsay, 
family stories, ‘common knowledge,’ or media images, notions about a 
place build up over time, become difficult to undo” (Reynolds, 2004 p.145-
146).  A person may see a particular place as dangerous because of a 
story a friend told her about almost being robbed.  Someone may hunch 
their shoulders and/or walk quickly through a place or space they feel is 
unsafe or a situation they prefer to ignore.  Such habits inhibit 
understanding for effective (a)venues.  Recall the visual and rhetorical 
habits of Addams’s readers from chapter two.  They experienced place as 
the (habitually) taken-for-granted safe space away from lower-class 
neighborhoods and impoverished people, but should they commit to 
engaged experiences, such places can afford new understandings and 
possible (a)venues.  Avoidance habits then can often be observed when a 
privileged insider accidentally or even purposefully drives, walks, or moves 
through poverty-stricken neighborhoods or a space that has been 
inhabited by the homeless.  The practices and habits of the homeless 
assuredly get inscribed upon their bodies, which may never recover from 
exposure, hunger, and thirst.  The insider must eventually, through 
engaged experience, recognize and alter habituated behaviors in places 
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and spaces of poverty and oppression, opening up to engaged 
experience.  This can facilitate a better understanding of the situation, 
necessary for (a)venues. 
Geographically identifiable places for social action are material 
venues, but they can never be divorced from the reflection of avenues – 
the imaginative, reflective, and inventive.  In her book on democracy and 
places of invention, Candice Rai offers an explanation of place but with 
the addition of an inventive property:  
The rhetorical forces that circulate and the resources that manifest 
within social spaces constitute, then, what I call the places of 
invention – a simple concept intended to capture the radical 
complexity of rhetorical situations by evoking multiple and 
interrelated meanings of “place” as the raw materialities of concrete 
places, the social narrative and histories we invest in those places; 
the genre, practices and institutions that emerge and help people 
act within places; and the rhetorical commonplaces, or topoi, that 
travel within places. (2016 p.8) 
Reynolds mentions such a place of invention in the higher 
education trend of sending students out of the classroom and into 
communities they may not otherwise visit.  This is done “in order to 
position the learner as an outsider, a foreigner, an other” (2004 p.113).  
Such a positioning, Reynolds argues, can cause discomfort, which “often 
stimulates reflection” (2004 p.113).  People experience place in different 
material as well as metaphorical ways depending on familiarity, rumors 
about the place or area, and more, but these ways, which have often 
become habitual may be disrupted and stimulate reflection, increase 
understanding, and work towards (a)venues for ethical social action. 
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Identifiable places play an important role for social action venues 
and imagining (a)venues for social action.  As will be looked at in this next 
section, Addams anticipated these ways of thinking about the material, 
metaphorical, and place and space, even critical materialism as she 
uncovered and spread the word about the underlying systemic causes of 
poverty and inter-class strife.  (A)venues are about keeping in mind the 
shuttling between the effect physical place has on ideation (the formation 
of concepts), which emerges from engaged embodied experiences, and 
the influence imagination has on possible social actions as situated in 
particular places and spaces. 
 
(A)venues for Social Action 
Addams’s engaged experience suggests (a)venues for effective 
social action by making use of such tools as critical imagination and 
materialism as well as  the possibilities and restrictions of the lived 
experience of place.   While she does not reference Hull House directly in 
Democracy and Social Ethics, Jane Addams’s own understanding of the 
marginalized — their thoughts, stories, experiences, suffering, and needs 
— grew largely out of her engaged experiences there and in the 
surrounding neighborhoods.  This place or venue of Hull House was 
critical.  It was Addams’s primary avenue (approach) to engaging with 
such communities was non-judgmental, open, and sympathetic.  
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Essentially, the intention of this avenue was to help her and others, 
including members of various communities, to imagine (a)venues for 
effective social action. 
First, a little more needs to be said about Hull House and its 
mission in order to contextualize Addams’s experiences and how those 
suggest (a)venues.  Addams and Ellen Gates Starr co-founded Hull 
House in 1889.  The settlement house stood in Chicago’s Near West Side, 
the Nineteenth Ward on Halsted street, in a neighborhood consisting 
primarily of working-class Italian immigrants.  Addams lived in Hull House 
for several years and this “immersed her in disempowered communities” 
(2009 p.54).  Knight describes what Addams and Starr must have 
experienced during those first few days: “Those smells — of rotting food, 
animal carcasses, spilled beer, and human and animal waste…at night, 
big black rats scurried about…and then there were the ‘dirt and the soot’  
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Figure 4.3 Halsted Street circa 1900 
 
from the coal smoke of factories” (2005 p.199-200; Figure 4.3).  These 
material conditions undoubtedly disturbed Addams, positioned her as an 
outsider, and just as Reynolds argues, stimulated reflect.   Although from 
affluence and wealth herself, these conditions did not deter her nor did the 
neighbors’ initial reluctance to accept invitations to Hull House (Knight, 
2005 p.199).  It was a place with people’s attendant and habitual ways of 
conducting their day-to-day business and personal lives, and the people 
living there were suspicious of prosperous women who wanted to live 
surrounded by such conditions.  Addams and Starr’s conviction eventually 
paid off though, and the people in the community largely accepted that 
they genuinely wanted to help (Knight, 2005 p.203-205).  It seems 
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apparent that, as was described in the last chapter, they had adopted an 
open-minded stance of compassion, listening, and care for engaging with 
people in the community.  They were invited more and more to people’s 
homes, simply to visit with and hear peoples’ stories or to minister to their 
needs in some way (Knight, 2005 p.203-205).  Their stance and the 
people’s eventual acceptance of their presence gave them more 
opportunities to learn about the people and their struggles. 
Hull House is an example of an (a)venue: a physical location that 
facilitated imagining different approaches to social action, which 
continually evolved through ongoing discovery and knowledge-building.  
Hull House had a couple of primary missions that coincide with (a)venues 
for social action: “to provide the women and men of Addams and Starr’s 
generation, over-cultured and isolated in their class, with a way to live up 
to the high ideals they had been taught,” and “to repair the damage done 
to egalitarian social relations by massive industrialization…and massive 
immigration” (Knight, 2010 p.66).  These missions were to be realized to 
some degree through the volunteers that came from the upper classes to 
Hull House and through the social and educational opportunities for the 
community.   Hull House provided a physical venue for both missions, 
which helped Addams, the volunteers, and the community to imagine 
possibilities for social action.  Addams learned increasingly more about 
the conditions that perpetuated poverty and injustice and became close to 
the community.  Her and Starr’s visits to the derelict houses of the poor to 
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mind children and nurse the sick  “taught them more than anything else 
they did about the lives of the working-class people among whom they 
now lived” (Knight, 2005 p.206).  What Addams learned over the ensuing 
years’ experience deepened her understanding of the complex challenges 
these people faced: “the city’s economy and the practices of employers 
had produced the scarcity around them [and] city politics influenced the 
number of jobs in the ward” (Knight, 2005 p.201). She learned about “the 
grinding nature of industrial work, the reasons for the neighborhood 
children’s intense material aspirations, and most important, the impact that 
poverty had on souls and minds” (Knight, 2005 p.202-203).  Shortly, 
Addams used what she learned to help in any way she could, turning her 
knowledge into many different (a)venues of social action.  Hull House 
provided a venue (place) to test those imagined avenues.  She devised all 
sorts of clubs and educational events at Hull House and with community 
members, Addams helped to organize an array of services: kindergarten, 
education classes, college extension courses; relief, loan, burial, and 
literary societies; Russian, Polish, German Jewish, and Greek 
organizations (Knight, 2005 p.204).  The lectures given at Hull House 
covered such topics as strikes, socialism, and trade unions (Knight, 2005 
p.205).  For Addams, other upper-class volunteers, and the people in the 
various communities surrounding Hull House, these events and services 




Hull House is one example of an (a)venue, but to return to 
Democracy and Social Ethics, Addams described a variety of experiences 
that imagine, but do not prescribe, possible (a)venues for social action.  In 
her chapter on political reform, Addams describes what she discovered 
about political corruption.  First, she noticed that the upper-class largely 
disregarded politics “as something off by itself…recogniz[ing] their duty as 
part of good citizenship, but political effort [was] not the expression of their 
moral or social life” (1902 p.66).  They focused on how the government 
functions – the procedures and reforming them.  These were elected 
officials and representatives that pushed for procedural reform, but failed 
to perceive the needs of lower, working-class people who looked to those 
“who are part of the entire life of the community” because they “liv[e] near 
to the masses of voters, knowing them intimately” (1902 p.67, 68).  
Therefore, how these men were perceived by members of the community 
depended on place as a physical location.  Men in leadership roles living 
in physical proximity to large concentrations of the working-class were 
perceived more favorably; unfortunately, even if their actions belied 
corruption.  For example, Addams recalls the situation surrounding a 
corrupt city council member, an alderman.  This alderman managed 
saloons, accepted bribes from corporations, and bribed his political 
opposition by offering them and their children jobs (Addams 1902 p.72, 
78).  Recognizing this corruption and seeing how the alderman used his 
knowledge of the community to exploit people, the women of Hull House 
128 
 
repeatedly attempted to unseat him (Hamington, 2009 p.73).  They were 
unsuccessful.  The key to retaining his power was place-based because 
he lived near them and knew them.   In addition, he would see a need and 
provide:  “pays rent for the hard-pressed tenant,” he “distributes each 
Christmas many tons of turkeys,” “gives presents at weddings and 
christenings,” and provides funeral services for those who cannot afford it 
(Addams, 1902 p.70, 72, 71).   Addams recognizes the machinery at work 
to secure the loyalty of the people to the alderman, one of which was 
charity.  However, she always held firm to the belief that by itself such 
charity could do little to alleviate the underlying problems stemming from 
such corruption.  So, what (a)venues might she imagine to solve or merely 
alleviate the problem? 
The (a)venues Addams imagines take into consideration the 
materiality of the situations she has observed, analyzed, and reflected 
upon.  Someone truly capable of rectifying the situation would, according 
to Addams, be a person: 
…who really knew the people and their great human needs, who 
believed that it was the business of government to serve them, and 
who further recognized the educative power of a sense of 
responsibility, would posses a clew (sic.) by which he might analyze 
the situation. He would find out what needs, which the alderman 
supplies, are legitimate ones which the city itself could undertake. 
(1902 p. 79) 
The imagined avenue then would essentially be a person of good 
character: someone who acknowledged their social responsibility and how 
enacting it builds knowledge and an understanding of the needs that might 
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be supplied for by government relief.  Addams describes this person as “a 
man of high moral culture [and] as one who thinks of himself, not as an 
isolated individual, but as a part in a social organism” (1902 p.79).  In fact, 
Addams contends that everyone should eventually be convinced that “his 
individual needs are common needs, that is, public needs, and that they 
can only be legitimately supplied for him when they are supplied for all” 
(1902 p. 79).  This repeats her call for social ethics and may seem 
somewhat repetitive and circular.  The (a)venue consists of the very 
components of activist inquiry: acknowledging social responsibility and 
having engaged experiences.  The suggestion of government assistance 
however is new and more concrete. If some of people’s most pressing 
needs were met not by an official close to the people but corrupt, then 
perhaps he could be elected out of office.  It indicates at least one 
(a)venue Addams believed could be successful.  Such government 
assistance programs have since been instituted, but the solution she 
posits is not as key here as the process of imagining (a)venues being 
suggestive and not prescriptive. 
Addams also made observations about education and its 
relationship to manual, factory labor that indicate the need to imagine  
(a)venues for teaching the value of all work.  Engaging with community 
members, Addams saw the extent to which formal, public education was 
failing the working class: “prepar[ing] children almost exclusively for 
commercial and professional life” (1902 p.59).  One of her primary 
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concerns was that this education tacitly promised upward mobility when 
the reality was that most children would begin, as early as 12, working in 
the factories and likely remain there for a lifetime.  It could be assumed 
from this that Addams endorsed an (a)venue where students learn only 
that which they need to work in the factories.  However, she was actually 
more concerned about the reproduction of a class relationship: 
professional careers are better and more valuable than jobs in manual 
labor. Addams noted the implicit devaluation of manual labor in an 
education geared towards commercial, clerical, or professional careers:  
The children of the working people learn many useful things in the 
public schools, but the commercial arithmetic, and many other 
studies, are founded on the tacit assumption that a boy rises in life 
by getting away from manual labor — that every promising boy 
goes into business or a profession. (1902 p.59) 
Of course, the vast majority did not achieve this goal.  In fact, as 
Addams elaborated, “the one fixed habit which the boy carries away with 
him from the school to the factory is the feeling that his work is merely 
provisional”  (1902 p.58).  Factory work is temporary.  The child’s 
experience at school has taught him that his “present effort is to get ready 
for something else” - a professional career (1902 p.58).  This reinforces 
the dominant social ideology that business careers are the only or best 
way to achieve a higher class, socially and financially.  It also teaches “the 
schoolboy within a town” Addams noticed, “[to look] upon work in the 
factory as an occupation of ignorant and unsuccessful men” (p.59).  The 
message is that the educated man gets a professional or business career 
131 
 
and he does this by going to school.  Based on her experiences — her 
observations of and conversations with the community (i.e. amidst the 
physical venue of the neighborhoods and their residents) — the avenue 
Addams imagines is a broadened conception of education that entails 
teaching the value that all labor is essential for life and therefore worthy of 
equal regard. 
Teaching manual laborers how their work contributes to the social 
whole is a more specific avenue that branches off from this broader 
valuing of all labor.  From Addams’s perspective all people’s work should 
be valued in as much equal measure as can be reasonably attained 
because:  
Theoretically we would all admit that the man at the bottom, who 
performs the meanest and humblest work, so long as the work is 
necessary, performs a useful function; but we do not live up to our 
theories, and in addition to his hard and uninteresting work he is 
covered with a sort of contempt, and unless he falls into illness or 
trouble, he receives little sympathy or attention. (1902 p.59) 
Manual labor and low-paying jobs are looked down upon even as 
people profess the value of the work being done by maids, construction 
and food service workers and so on. Addams argues for giving the 
average working man “some notion of his social and industrial value” 
(1902 p.57).  Giving a worker “the conception of historic continuity in order 
to reveal to him the purpose and utility of his work, and he can only be 
stimulated and dignified as he obtains a conception of his…relation to 
society” (1902 p.62).  People must be able to see themselves as Addams 
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says, “in connection and cooperation with the whole” (1902 p.66).  This 
represents an avenue, but how might it be achieved and through what 
venue?  In Addams’s experience, “commercialism itself, at least in its 
larger aspect, tends to educate the workingman better than organized 
education does” (1902 p.65).  Addams is referring to a company out of 
Dayton, Ohio that held yearly gatherings of all its employees.  During 
these gatherings, such commonplace things as profits and output were 
reported, but also: “Any man who has made an invention in connection 
with the machinery of the factory, at this time publicly receives a prize, and 
suggestions are approved that tend to increase the comfort and social 
facilities of the employees” (1902 p.65).  This is an admittedly idyllic and 
largely disproven approach since Addams’s time, but she believed that it 
could help workers to see their single contribution to the company in 
relation to its overall goal.  She says, “at least for the moment there is a 
complete esprit de corps, and the youngest and least skilled employee 
sees himself in connection with the interests of the firm, and the spread of 
an invention” (1902 p.65).  She admits though that it is a “crude example 
of what might be done” (1902 p.65).  However, again, this specific 
(a)venue is not the point, but rather how experience informs 
understanding and can lead to imagining possible (a)venues for alleviating 
a social injustice.  In this case, it is the social and financial devaluing of 
manual labor, which leads to increased inequality and class division. 
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In Addams’s criticism of education and its relationship to manual 
labor lies a persisting issue.  Education still largely privileges professional 
careers as tools of social mobility.  This is not in itself a bad thing; 
however, social mobility is still predominately characterized by a move 
from manual labor to the “better” non-manual labor.  This seems natural to 
many because professional labor typically comes with higher salaries.  
However, this may be at least in part due to the poor perception of manual 
laborers.  There is an underlying suggestion of an (a)venue to possibly 
lessen this problem: educational institutions should incorporate into their 
curriculum lessons that show respect and appreciation for jobs traditionally 
looked down upon, such as factory workers in Addams’s day and janitors, 
fast-food workers, retail salesmen, among others in ours. 
 
Conclusion 
Formulating ways to alter and not reinforce unjust situations is 
challenging, but engaged experience of the kind described in this 
dissertation can foster understanding and knowledge-building.  Engaged 
experiences can result in new understandings of the people and the 
underlying causes of marginalization, oppression, and poverty.  This 
knowledge can in turn suggest what I have been calling (a)venues.  
(A)venues represent both (imaginative) approaches or ideas for social 
action and places or venues in which to act.  Addams suggested places, 
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such as a settlement house.  Truly close engagement of the kind Addams 
endorsed, living and moving through the neighborhoods themselves, 
immerses an individual in the community, which can disrupt visual and 
rhetorical habits and motivate people to take action.  Addams primarily 
wanted to foster in her readers the insider-outsider subjectivity and she 
had a conviction that an insider to wealth and power could and should 
engage closely and openly with the marginalized and oppressed.  Activist 
inquiry heeds that conviction.  Engaged experience provides opportunities 
for discovery and learning in place and for consciously making use of the 
tools of critical imagination and critical materialism for (a)venues.  These 
can expose links between people and their labor for example that for the 
privileged insider were heretofore hidden behind the train.  These can lead 
to yet more (a)venues for social action.  The process of activist inquiry and 
thinking of agency as invention comes full circle.  Acknowledging social 
responsibility can motivate someone to have engaged experiences, which 
can motivate them to imagine (a)venues for effective social action, to take 





Conclusion: Taking Activist Inquiry on the Road  
Out there things can happen and frequently do to people as brainy and 
footsy as you.  And when things start to happen, don’t worry.  Don’t stew.  
Just go right along.  You’ll start happening too.  Oh!  The places you’ll go! 
— Dr. Seuss (1990) 
 
As I sat down to write this conclusion, Dr. Seuss’s classic Oh, the 
Places You’ll Go!  popped into my head.   Perhaps it is simply because I 
am on the verge of embarking on the next journey in my own life, but I felt 
compelled to track the book down.  After some rummaging, I found it in my 
son’s room on top of a big stack of books, as if awaiting me.  I flipped 
through it and noticed some surprising parallels between the story of the 
protagonist and activist inquiry.  The protagonist moves through an array 
of different places and spaces, discovering and experiencing all the good 
and bad that life brings.  The bad things will be disturbing like the 
disruptive emotional experiences of activist inquiry: “you can get all hung 
up in a prickle-ly perch,” there will be “bang-ups and hang-ups,” and 
sometimes “you’ll get mixed up” (1990).  Other moments seem to prompt 
self-reflection, flexibility, and change: “never forget to be dexterous and 
deft and never mix up your right foot with your left” and “be sure when you 
step, step with care and great tact and remember that Life’s a Great 
Balancing Act” (1990). As with the caring, compassionate stance needed 
for engaged experience, remember to act with care and deliberation.  The 
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overall encouraging tone of the tale also seems to urge the reader to go 
out into the world and discover and learn about all different kinds of people 
and places.  All the while, the reader’s agency is affirmed: “You have 
brains in your head, you have feet in your shoes, you can steer yourself 
any direction you choose” (1990 p.2).  However, as we know, the idea of 
agency is not as clear as this suggests. 
For Rhetoric/Composition scholars, agency has been a hard 
concept to clarify.  Employing the term “agency” immediately invokes the 
tension between humanist and postmodernist perspectives.  Thinking of 
agency as a form of invention, activist inquiry, has aimed to shift the 
conversation’s focus from this dichotomy to how social action may be 
generated.  The extreme perspectives of agency have largely been 
considered unrealistic.  People do not have (own) either complete agency 
nor are their lives entirely pre-determined by their social, political, 
economic, or cultural experiences - past or present.  Scholars also 
recognize that the rhetorical situation can hinder or promote people’s 
sense that their actions can and will affect positive social change.  
Therefore, many scholars have turned to analyzing specific situations, 
looking for and critiquing the factors that hindered or promoted a person’s 
or a group of people’s agency.  Implicitly, and on occasion explicitly, such 
work veers towards imagining how the resultant conclusions from such 
analyses could be used to encourage or kindle agency in others for the 
purpose of effective social action.  Fleckenstein, for example, theorizes 
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knots of social action and argues that visual and rhetorical habits in place 
can work in ways that bring about social action. 
Activist inquiry has aimed to contribute to a similar theorization by 
positing a non-prescriptive, inquiry-oriented approach to inventing agency 
for social action – an approach that Jane Addams presaged in Democracy 
and Social Ethics.  Although she was writing this book over a century ago, 
as many scholars in the fields of philosophy and education have attested, 
her work and philosophy remains relevant to contemporary social activists.  
Nackenoff puts it this way, “If would-be reformers were to look to a usable 
past in order to craft a persuasive model for twenty-first century 
democratic selves, they would gain a great deal by drawing upon the 
wisdom, vision, and activism of Jane Addams” (2009 p.120).  I looked to 
Addams and discovered that her methodology in Democracy and Social 
Ethics compellingly demonstrated an approach to encouraging social 
action that coincided with many of the steps I wanted activist inquiry to 
take.  It also endorsed the characteristics I wanted those steps to include 
in order to invent agency for effective social action.  Thinking about 
agency as a form of rhetorical invention has attempted to shift scholar-
activist’s attention away, even if only a little, from the 
humanist/postmodernist dichotomy invoked by using the term.  Instead, it 
puts the focus on the production of agency for the purposes of social 
action: to assuage injustice and enact positive social change that lessens 
the detrimental effects of discrimination.  In this final chapter, I will sum up 
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the process of activist inquiry and then consider some of its limitations as 
a top-down model for initiating social action.  I will briefly explore and 
suggest how activist inquiry might function in the context of the 21st 
century. 
 
Activist Inquiry in a Nutshell 
Activist inquiry has three overarching components or steps to 
inventing agency for social action: recognition, motivation, and (a)venues.  
The first step involves ways to tackle the challenge of convincing others 
that they have a social obligation to the well-being of the marginalized and 
oppressed.  This sense of social responsibility is what Addams’s referred 
to as a social ethic and the methodology she used in Democracy and 
Social Ethics to try to convince her readers has several features that 
activist inquiry draws on.  These are like components or sub-steps under 
the broader heading of recognition.  First, a rhetor-activist needs to have a 
very nuanced understanding of their target audience, what in 
Rhetoric/Composition is called audience addressed (Ede and Lunsford 
1984).  Addams, for example, knew her readers very well because she 
had grown up among them – the upper-class elites.  While this was 
Addams’s target audience, the middle and upper-middle classes are also 
among possible target audiences for activist inquiry.  The point is Addams 
was an insider and for activist inquiry, I argue that being an insider is the 
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most ideal position for knowing and gaining knowledge about an audience.  
While she would not have used this terminology, Addams knew her 
readers’ visual and rhetorical habits.  An outsider, as opposed to an 
insider, must overcome any number of boundaries: cultural, racial, 
political, economical, and so on, making it more challenging to glean 
accurate, useful, and detailed information about an audience.  Of course, 
it must also be admitted that having a target audience does not preclude 
possible secondary and tertiary audiences.  Having a specific target 
audience, however, can make the task of audience addressed and 
audience invoked, the next two steps, more straightforward.  The rhetor-
activist uses their knowledge to create (invoke) the reader.  This is a 
fiction the rhetor-activist constructs that describes the reader as having 
already adopted a socially responsible role.  The construction can be 
aided with the strategic use of the rhetorical “we,” like Addams uses, to 
promote a sense of solidarity, like-mindedness, and cooperation.  “We” 
urges the reader to identify with the rhetor-activist as an insider – as one 
of them.  It also helps with the more difficult task of gently and implicitly 
criticizing the reader’s individualistic and often selfish perspective on 
issues pertaining to marginalized and oppressed people.  Remember that 
the goal here is convince an audience to acknowledge their social 
responsibility, and acknowledging this is a step towards building a sense 
of agency through the rhetorical situation.  Tacit critiques have a chance of 
revealing the contradictions inherent in hypocrisy: professing to care about 
140 
 
others in general and the oppressed more specifically but failing to act 
upon that value.  I say “have a chance” here because there is no 
guarantee.  Overcoming people’s resistance to consider themselves more 
critically, realize value-based discrepancies, and make personal changes 
is very challenging.  This is where engaged experience becomes 
important. 
 Engaged experience plays a key role in all three parts of activist 
inquiry. Enacting an ethic of social responsibility necessarily requires the 
audience to take some kind of action and engaged experience can help 
them to acknowledge as well as reinforce the social ethic.  In other words, 
as Addams argues, wide experience teaches people why they should be 
socially responsible because through it they begin to sympathize and even 
empathize with others.  Engaged experience though is more specific than 
wide experience.  It entails deliberate, purposeful interaction with 
marginalized and oppressed people in their communities.  This cannot be 
a superficial kind of interaction; therefore, a person must 
discover/uncover, examine, and reflect upon their preconceived notions 
about these people and their communities – their visual and rhetorical 
habits.  These can hinder, or prompt as Fleckenstein argues, agency for 
social action.  Engaged experience necessitates a particular rhetorical 
stance that takes us to the next step: motivation. 
Motivation represents a particular challenge to inventing agency for 
social action.  For activist inquiry, this means convincing the target 
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audience to be motivated to engage, in particular ways, with marginalized 
and oppressed communities.  Particular ways of engaging represent a 
rhetorical stance.  Engagement for motivation is not just a question of 
what to do, but how to do it: how should a person who has acknowledge 
their social responsibility engage with these communities?  An upper-class 
person cannot (and should not) mindlessly walk into a lower-class African 
American community and expect to 1) be accepted and 2) know what 
needs to be done to help them. Eventually being accepted by a 
community, as Addams eventually was, essentially can give a person 
insider-knowledge, like that of knowing the target audience because of 
being an insider.  Engaged experience can foster such acceptance, but 
first a person needs to carefully consider their rhetorical stance:  their 
attitude towards or way of facing different others.  For the motivation work 
of activist inquiry, rhetorical stance must incorporate such feminist 
practices as compassionate living, rhetorical listening, and embodied care 
(Fleckenstein, Ratcliffe, and Hamington).  These practices come together 
to describe a stance that is compassionate, caring, and open to hearing 
others’ stories. 
Adopting this stance for engaged experience facilitates knowledge-
building and understanding of the community and its people.  This can 
motivate would-be activists, giving them a sense of agency for social 
action because for one, they better understand the reality of the situations 
faced by marginalized and oppressed people.  They perceive some of the 
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underlying causes of poverty as stemming from a host of socio-political 
factors.  Secondly, engaged experience practiced with an open rhetorical 
stance may reveal significant emotionally disruptive contradictions similar 
in some ways to those that occur during recognition work.  These 
contradictions can nurture sympathy and empathy, helping a person to 
make the transition from feeling for to feeling with others and furthering 
even more knowledge-building and understanding.  As Hamington puts it, 
Addams believed that “if we know one another better, we will care…if 
someone who is misunderstood, or made to be ‘other’ can be brought into 
the light of familiarity, the potential for care is greater” (2009 p.73).  For 
instance, a person may assume for example that a family of five on 
welfare must be abusing the government support system and doing little 
work to support themselves.  It would be easy for some to look down upon 
the family.  However, by engaging with them from an open rhetorical 
stance, a contradiction emerges:  this is not, as expected, a single-mother 
raising her four kids, but a couple who work two jobs a piece.  They are 
un-skilled laborers because of a poor education, stemming from the 
inadequately funded schools of the neighborhoods in which they were 
born and raised – not a choice of their making.  For some, it is emotionally 
disturbing to discover not only that they were mistaken, but that factors out 
of the family’s control have led them to being in an unjust situation.   As 
sympathy, empathy, knowledge and understanding increase because of 
engaged experience and the contradictions it can reveal so too does the 
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(potential for) motivation and agency to take social action. 
Engaged experience segues into the next part of activist inquiry:  
the challenge of knowing what social action could be effective.  Social 
action in this sense includes both imagining what might work and where it 
might work, what I have come to call (a)venues.  Avenues are the ideas 
formulated through engaged experience as a person moves through 
and/or inhabits spaces and places, which could turn into venues for social 
action.  People adopt unconscious and conscious ways of moving through 
a space or place.  Someone may move languidly and peacefully through a 
park, sensing that it is a safe place in a safe area of the city, or they may 
move hurriedly through a subway in what they perceive as the dangerous 
part of town.  As Reynolds would argue, both are ways of experiencing the 
space.  Addams initially moved through the neighborhoods around Hull 
House with some trepidation, but committing to what I would say is 
engaged experience, she eventually adopted a sense of belonging to the 
places and spaces.  Arriving at such a point, this kind of engaged 
experience, this moving through and inhabiting, means the outsider has 
become an insider, and as previously touched upon, an insider knows 
more about the rhetorical situation.  Critical imagination and critical 
materialism contribute layers to this experience.  They provide critique and 
analysis for seeing the unseen and conceiving of ways of and places for 
ameliorating unjust situations (Scott and Welch; Kirsch and Royster).  












inventing a sense of agency for social action.  At last, agency is invented 
through activist inquiry as those involved have built, layer by layer through 
this process, a sense that their actions can have positive, ethical effects 
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Figure 5.1 Visual representation of activist inquiry 
 
together in a circle of interaction between and among their constituent 
parts.  Each of the three parts attempts to consider various aspects of the 
rhetorical situation while purposefully remaining open enough to imagined 
possibilities to be non-prescriptive.  Being non-prescriptive eases the 





The Limitations of a Top-Down Model for Social Action 
As with any theory, process, or heuristic, activist inquiry has its 
limitations particularly as it pertains to the hoped-for end result of social 
action.  I will briefly look at a couple of them:  the impact of power relations 
on activist inquiry’s top-down process for social action, and the risk and 
drawbacks of it being misinterpreted as a call for charity work.  Activist 
inquiry is not guaranteed to function as readily as it has been laid out in 
this dissertation, and the power relations between the wealthy and the 
impoverished exacerbate its chances of working.  Activist inquiry is 
primarily a top-down model for social action, where wealthier people are 
eventually moved to assuage unjust situations; however, as I mentioned 
earlier, “wealthier” does not necessarily mean just the top 1%.  Although I 
have referenced Freire, this is in contradiction to his pedagogy, which 
imagines empowering the poor and oppressed to take control of their 
education and confront those with social, political, and economic power: a 
bottom-up model of social action.  More recently, Artz makes a compelling 
argument for the working majority’s power and obligation to create social 
change, “to end and prevent US wars…to reverse global warming, to end 
race and gender discrimination” (2011 p.54).  He takes this as far as 
believing, “the future of humanity depends on the ability of those who work 
to speak, to act, to lead” (2011 p.54).  I do not disagree with Freire, Artz, 
or anyone else on this matter, but activist inquiry does not preclude the 
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agency or empowerment of the oppressed.  They may work in conjunction 
or separately towards the same social action goals.  Furthermore, activist 
inquiry stresses working with the oppressed and it has the potential for the 
privileged insider to take on the role of facilitating their agency and 
empowerment without prescribing action.  Addams for example 
encouraged community members, and not just upper-class volunteers, to 
propose, guide, and teach their own education courses. 
Regardless, the power that wealth and authority wield can hinder 
activist inquiry because, for one, a privileged insider may misunderstand 
the situation and/or misrepresent the people involved, a concern Addams 
echoed.  Engaged experience involves going into marginalized and 
oppressed communities, even possibly living in them as she did.  A 
privileged insider may very well remain an outsider to the community, 
never fully being accepted sufficiently enough for members to feel 
comfortable voicing their concerns, stories, and ideas. In this case, the 
privileged insider’s knowledge and understanding of the situation is more 
likely to be incomplete, risking ineffective social action that re-inscribes the 
injustice.  However, as was discussed in chapter three, activist inquiry 
proposes a specific rhetorical stance whose purpose is to diminish the 
problems associated with power relations.  It asks an insider to reflect 
upon and adopt a stance characterized by compassion, non-judgment, 
care, and openness for engaging with people and their communities: 
compassionate living, rhetorical listening, and embodied care 
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(Fleckenstein, Ratcliffe, and Hamington).  The intention behind these, as 
mentioned in the above summary of activist inquiry, is that they can 
encourage sympathy (feeling for), empathy (feeling with), knowledge-
building, and understanding, which can pave the way for more effective 
social action.  Power will remain a problem even if a person has good 
intentions though because it has been argued and generally accepted 
among scholars that power, like agency, cannot be possessed by a 
person.  In the Foucauldian sense, power is dispersed and diffused 
through discourse (1995).  Nonetheless, I contend that the rhetorical 
stance for engaged experience holds promise for effective social action 
and that a top-down model can be effective.  Artz believes in the power of 
the working class majority, but he also feels the second thing that needs to 
be done for social action is to “identify human agents capable of making 
fundamental social change – those social classes and their allies who 
have a vested interest, some predisposition, and the actual power to 
improve the human condition” (2011 p.14).  For such a privileged insider 
to power, an open, caring, non-judgmental stance like I have attempted to 
describe, stands a chance of diminishing the possibility of 
misunderstanding and misrepresentation. 
Another limitation to activist inquiry is that at any point in the 
process it may be misinterpreted as merely calling for charity work.  This 
depends on how such work is defined, but looking to Addams for 
guidance, she relegated charity to throwing money at a problem and did 
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not deem it effective.  Of course, many of the things she did for the 
Halsted Street community today would be thought of as charity work: 
nursing the sick, visiting the poor, and yes, even providing some financial 
assistance for emergency situations.  However, to think of the social 
action resulting from activist inquiry as charity alone risks addressing Scott 
and Welch’s foremost train and failing to perceive the underlying, systemic 
reasons of injustice running in the background.  Certainly, this is always a 
risk and the drawbacks, once more, are misunderstanding the situation 
and possibly reinforcing it; however, activist inquiry calls for the engaged 
experience with the hope that it will help a person see the train running in 
the background – those political, social, and economic forces that 
perpetuate classism, racism, sexism, and homophobia to name just a few. 
 
Activist Inquiry in the 21st Century 
In her article on agency, Cooper says that “we need a pedagogy of 
responsibility” (2011 p.443).  The first component of activist inquiry, 
acknowledging social responsibility, seems apt for such a pedagogy.  
Activist inquiry has not been formulated for the classroom and in the spirit 
of being non-prescriptive, I will leave it to others to flesh out the specifics 
of a composition class pedagogy that utilizes the process.  However, I can 
briefly imagine what it might more generally look like.  Activist inquiry 
lends itself to community service learning, which is sometimes called 
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community engagement learning.  One service-learning instructor aptly 
describes service learning as: 
A form of experiential education where learning occurs through a 
cycle of action and reflection as students ... seek to achieve real 
objectives for the community and deeper understanding and skills 
for themselves. In the process, students link personal and social 
development with academic and cognitive development ... 
experience enhances understanding; understanding leads to more 
effective action. (Bandy) 
Activist inquiry clearly coincides with the experience, action, 
reflection, and understanding in service learning, and there is a long 
history of service learning in Rhetoric/Composition instruction as well.  
However, I have serious doubts that the kind of deep, engaged experience 
activist inquiry calls for would be possible in a 16-week course.  This is not 
to say that students could not or would not discover, learn, and come to a 
better understanding of the communities and people they would engage 
with, but for inventing agency for effective social action, this would likely 
be superficial knowledge.  Thinking of her on geographical methodology 
and how to deploy it in an educational setting, Reynolds notes a few of the 
many limitations to service learning.  Many scholars report that students 
“fall back on ‘How can we help these people?’ instead of the harder 
question, ‘Why are the conditions this way’” (2004 p.133).  Since activist 
inquiry, in order to invent agency, aims for action beyond what the first 
question implies, charity, this would be a severe limitation to its 
effectiveness in a coursework setting.  For the student, there is also the 
requirement aspect of service learning assignments.  They become forced 
150 
 
volunteers working for a grade and this often backfires either for the 
community or the student and sometimes for both Forbes et. al. argues 
(1999).  The community may not understand why students are being 
required to volunteer and assume it must be some form of forced 
restitution, a punishment for bad behavior.  Because of this assumption, 
some students have been treated poorly by the very people they are trying 
to help (2004).  Reynolds goes on to look at some additional drawbacks, 
however, these few examples of the drawbacks of service learning are 
enough to not recommend it to the work of activist inquiry. 
The following is a quick run-down of what I have imagined activist 
inquiry might look like.  Activist inquiry seems more fitting for rhetor-
activists, such as Rhetoric/Composition scholars, but also anyone who 
has already become Knight’s existential outsider-insider.  Hypothetically, I 
imagine a person who may not be particularly wealthy per se, but has 
some social, political, and/or economic power as part of the dominant 
culture.  Let’s say it is a solidly middle-class woman and she begins with 
some of her close friends or family.  She knows them and invokes; she 
implicitly critiques them and uses the rhetorical “we,” appealing to shared 
values.   Gradually, over time, one of them, let us say her brother-law, is 
encouraged to volunteer or otherwise engage with marginalized 
communities and people.  Our protagonist begins to discuss his 
experiences, how he feels about them, how he is approaching them.  She 
talks to him about how the way he approaches the people and situations 
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of his volunteer work, she urges him to be careful.  She begins to 
incorporate discussions about the underlying practices of compassionate 
living, rhetorical listening, and embodied care.  She does not have to use 
this terminology and in fact, for casual circumstances it would likely be 
best to avoid it.  Gradually, he comes to understand the importance of how 
he approaches his volunteer work.   He begins to listen to their stories as 
he helps them fill their carts with food from the pantry.  He builds 
knowledge and understanding of some of the underlying systemic causes 
of poverty and oppression.  Finally, he uses that knowledge to imagine 
(a)venues for social action.  During all this time, he has slowly been 
building agency, inventing it from all the features of the rhetorical 
situations he has encountered along the way. 
Realizing this is quite general, activist inquiry as a practiced 
process needs to be implemented and analyzed for its efficacy.  Also, in 
the above hypothetical scenario, I used the very general “volunteer;” 
however, I do believe that for activist inquiry to have the greatest impact, 
there need to be appropriately designated venues in which more 
extended, long term engagement can occur.   These must be in 
marginalized and impoverished communities, like Hull House was.  
Community centers and libraries may serve well in some circumstances, 
and certainly, they do some of the same work that Hull House did, 
providing education classes and space for events.  However, I am not 
convinced they function well for activist inquiry.  Further research is 
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needed to make a better judgment, looking at where these centers are 
situated in communities, who uses them most, what services they provide, 
what services people take advantage of and who takes advantage of 
them. 
With this dissertation, I have attempted to present a method 
through which agency may be invented and the dichotomy of 
humanist/postmodernist perspectives defining agency may be set aside in 
favor of the non-prescriptive generation of agency for social action.  
Towards the end of his article, Artz sets one final condition for activism: 
“present a rhetoric for a new consensual social power that underscores 
the truth of capitalist inequality, favor the building of participatory 
communities, and expresses the potential for new democratic social 
relations” (2011 p.54).  While I make no grandiose claim that activist 
inquiry is such a rhetoric, there is always a chance that it could be.  Inquiry 
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1 Jane Addams was a prominent American progressive social activist of 
the early 20th century, contributing to public opinion and social change 
from political and educational reform to the treatment of women and other 
marginalized members of society.  Her speeches, writings, and activism  
were far-reaching in their scope and their affects.  She fought for women’s 
suffrage and worker’s rights, advocated for children and the poor, civil 
liberties, and peace.  She helped to found the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, the American Civil Liberties Union, and 
he Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, and was 
awarded the Nobel Peace prize in 1931.  Her work contributed to 
preparing the U.S. for many of the social programs currently in place.  For 
example, the services offered free at the social settlement house Addams 
established, Chicago’s Hull House, such as job skills training, concerts, 
lectures on current issues, a gymnasium, and day care programs for small 
children influenced the rise of community enrichment and education 
programs and government assistance such as Social Security and 
Medicare.  Her many speeches, lectures, and published works espoused 
a philosophy founded upon democracy as “a form of socially engaged 
living and as a framework for social morality” (Hamington) and urged her 
audience to reflect upon the discrepancies between how they perceive a 
relationship and   how different others understand the dynamic; for 
example, the benefactor to the beneficiary, the union worker to the boss, 
and the educator to the student. Her approach to social problems called 
for encouraging, interpreting, and navigating direct experience and 
engagement with concrete social issues in ways that she believed could 
help people become more socially responsible for the wellbeing of all 
Americans.  Addams’s many contributions to society cannot be definitively 
measured, but such was her demeanor and influence that biographers 
and historians repeatedly compare her to another woman greatly admired 
by the American public: Eleanor Roosevelt. “[Addams] became one of the 
nation’s most effective reform leaders,” biographer Louise Knight says, “as 
influential in her day on both the national and world stages as Eleanor 
Roosevelt was in hers” (Knight, 2010 p. xiv).  Addams was clearly an 
activist that changed minds and greatly influenced the unfurling of the 20th 
century.    
 
2 See Nickled and Dimed, 2011; “Most Republicans think poverty caused 
by laziness, new poll finds,” 2014;  “People Have Always Thought the Poor 
were Lazy Degenerates,” 2014; “Editorial: Study proves poor people are 




                                                                                                                                                              
3 See William Duffy’s “Remembering Is the Remedy: Jane Addams’s 
Response to Conflicted Discourse” (2011); Robert Danish’s “Jane  
Addams, Pragmatism and Rhetorical Citizenship in Multicultural 
Democracies” (2007); and Gloria McMillan’s “Keeping the Conversation 
Going: Jane Addams’ Rhetorical Strategies in ‘A Modern Lear’ “ (2002); 
Catherine Peaden’s “Jane Addams and the Social Rhetoric of Democracy” 
(1993). 
 
4 In the late 1800s, according to Knight, democracy had several hotly 
contested and ideologically fraught meanings: political, economic, and 
social (Knight, 2005 p.187-189).  Politically, democracy was the right to 
vote - a power afforded to males, mostly white.  Economically, democracy 
was defined as the complete competitive freedom of the individual to set 
prices for goods and services and in general do business freely.  Socially, 
democracy was a feeling of equality, one espoused by John Dewey in an 
1888 essay Knight cites: “Democracy is a social, that is to say, an ethical 
conception” (Knight, 2005 p.188).  Thus, for Addams to conceive of a 
socially ethical democracy would not have been an entirely foreign idea to 
her audience, but social democracy was rarely observed in practice, which 
was undoubtedly one of the biggest factors that prompted Addams to write 
Democracy and Social Ethics (1902).  Addams wanted her readers to at 
least consider that if they do indeed believe in the most basic principles of 
democracy such as equality, then it must be organized by socially-oriented 
ideas rather than an over-reliance on individualism and separation from 
marginalized, disempowered, and frankly just different peoples.  She 
urged them “to break out of their narrow, class-defined family and social 
rounds and their private trajectories of ambition and come to know a wider 
range of people socially” (Knight, 2010 p. 107). 
 
5 In “Beyond Traditional Conceptualizations of Rhetoric and a Move 
Toward Civility,” Bone, Griffin, and Scholz address the criticism that 
invitational rhetoric implies that all persuasion is violent, coercive, and 
antagonistic.  They contend “under certain circumstances, to attempt to 
persuade is inappropriate, but they [Foss and Griffin] do not say that 
persuasion, by its very nature, is always and only violent” (2008 p.438). 
 
6 See Bone, Griffin and Schol: “Critics of the theory of invitational rhetoric 
responded in several ways, arguing that the association between 
persuasion and violence is unacceptable (Pollock, Artz, Frey Pearce, and 
Murphy, Dow “Feminism and Difference”; Dow “Feminism, Power”) that 
Foss and Griffin unrealistically advocate that invitational rhetoric be used 
in all situations (Cloud, et. al.), that the theory is gender specific (Condit, 
Mathison, and Bruner), or grounded in essentialist principles (Bruner et. 
al.), that invitational rhetoric lacks any notion of agency (Fulkerson, 
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Lozano-Reich, and Mathison), and or that it actually is persuasion in 
disguise (Cloud and Fulkerson)” (2008 p.435).   
 
7 As a Women’s Rights advocate, many of Addams’s texts address gender 
inequalities.  In Democracy and Social Ethics, the third chapter, “Filial 
Relations,” speaks directly to the issue of young educated women being 
expected to adopt traditional female roles  – wife, mother, homemaker –  
even as many of them desired to lead more public lives by being involved 
in politics and social issues.      
  
8 Some of these same photographs went on to be published in several late 
1930s magazines. Finnegan examines how the circulation of these 
photographs affected their interpretation.  Photographs whose original 
purpose was to document poverty changed meaning depending on what 
publication they were disseminated in, how the image was edited (cropped 
and colored), and what the accompanying captions included or excluded.  
In some cases this meant that the image was taken entirely out of context 
or became context-less, in which cases its aesthetics as a photograph 
dominated viewers responses instead of the poverty-stricken 
circumstances of which it was a record (2003).  
   
9 According to Fleckenstein’s explanation, “Burke advocates a deliberated 
courting of antinomy as a habit of mind necessary for individual and 
cultural health, preventing us from becoming too committed to or 
persuaded by one meaning, one value….antinomy carries with it echoes 
of transformation.  For Burke, invention – making something new – arises 
out of dialectic, a process of negotiating tensions implicit in all meaning.  
Because words are defined within the context of what they are, paradox is 
intrinsic to meaning…individuals efforts to resolve ambiguity produce new 
orders that are then subject to further resolution” (2010 p.116).  
  
10 Legislation in many states prevents people from receiving food 
assistance if they do not work at least 20 hours a week.  In other states, 
people must pass a drug test.  These two acts of legislation alone are 
indicators of the persistence of a hostile rhetoric of poverty and the idea of 
the “deserving poor” versus the “undeserving poor.” 
